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WILLIAMS V LEE AND THE DEBATE OVER
INDIAN EQUALITY
Bethany R. Berger*
Williams v. Lee (1959) created a bridge between century-old affir-
mations of the immunity of Indian territories from state jurisdiction
and the tribal self-determination policy of the twentieth century. It
has been called the first case in the modern era of federal Indian
law. Although no one has written a history of the case, it is gener-
ally assumed to be the product of a timeless and unquestioning
struggle of Indian peoples for sovereignty. This Article, based on in-
terviews with the still-living participants in the case and on
examination of the congressional records, Navajo council minutes,
and Supreme Court transcripts, records, and Justices' notes, reveals
an unexpected complexity in both Indian and non-Indian contribu-
tions to the case and to the era in federal Indian policy in which it
emerged.
This history shows that both Williams and the policy developments
that surrounded it emerged from consensus about the need for In-
dian equality and equal opportunity in the twentieth century, but
Indian and non-Indian debate whether equality meant full assimila-
tion and termination of the special legal status of tribes or
continued respect for the ability of Indian peoples to govern them-
selves. This Article makes this debate concrete through the story of
the Williams family, for whom the state collection action and the re-
sulting seizure of the family sheep herd struck at the heart of
Navajo lifestyle and culture. The Article further connects Williams
to the momentous debates over African-American integration gen-
erated with Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and Cooper v.
Aaron (1958). Ultimately, I argue, Williams v. Lee and the
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self-determination movement that followed it represent a choice by
American Indians to insist that respect for tribal status was neces-
sary to ensure Indian equality in the modem era. This history and
its results provide an important lesson today as federal Indian poli-
cies are increasingly attacked as fundamentally inconsistent with
fairness and equality.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 1958, while the Supreme Court was still reeling from
the reaction to its decision in Cooper v. Aaron' ordering the Little Rock
School District to continue the process of desegregation, the Justices heard
arguments in an almost unnoticed case. Williams v. Lee,2 an obscure collec-
tion action between a non-Indian trader and his Navajo customers on the
isolated Navajo reservation, appeared to have little to do with the momen-
tous debates over equality and integration absorbing the nation. Indeed, the
claim of Paul and Lorena Williams that disputes arising on the reservation
should be insulated from state jurisdiction might seem almost their antithe-
sis, a demand that Navajos retain a separate legal status from the rest of
America. But the case was the product of over a decade of debate, in the
Navajo Nation and in Indian country as a whole, about the best way for
American Indians to achieve equality and respect. The Williamses' victory
was a product of the emerging consensus among Native people that self-
1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
2. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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governing tribes had to be part of the answer. This Article reveals the crucial
and complex role of Indian choices and actions in a foundational case in
federal Indian law, and helps shed new light on debates about the status of
Indian people today.
Williams v. Lee has been described as the first case in the modern era of
federal Indian law.' It laid a legal foundation for the emerging tribal self-
determination movement and created a core precedent for subsequent cases
rebuffing state jurisdiction and protecting the integrity of tribal legal institu-
tions.4 When current tribal advocates bemoan the modem Supreme Court's
departures from precedent, Williams is one of the cases to which they look.'
But in the half century since it was decided, no one has written a history of
6the case.
Williams is typically understood in terms of two common narratives in
Indian law and policy. According to the first narrative, the case vindicates a
timeless and unquestioning struggle by Native people for sovereignty.
American Indians, in this narrative, have never considered whether contin-
ued separate status is the best course for their interests, but almost
instinctually sought to maintain the "measured separatism"' that federal In-
dian law provides. The second narrative considers Williams to be an
anomalous outlier of the Termination Policy that defined federal Indian law
from the 1940s to the 1960s. This policy, aimed at ending the separate status
of tribes and extending state jurisdiction over their lands, is generally seen
as wholly anti-Indian and contrary to Indian wishes. How, in this period,
could the Court have produced such a strong affirmation of tribal sover-
eignty?
The history recounted here, based on interviews with the still-living par-
ticipants in the case and examination of congressional records, Navajo
council minutes, and Supreme Court transcripts, records, and notes, reveals
a complexity that challenges both narratives. This history shows both the era
and the case itself to be the product of consensus about the need for Indian
equality and equal opportunity in the twentieth century and also of debate
inside and outside Indian country about what that equality would mean. It
makes concrete the ways in which the state court action struck at the heart
of the Navajo economy and culture, and why the Williams family fought so
hard in this case. Finally, the history of Williams shows the ways in which
the decision and the self-determination movement that followed it were the
3. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES
IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1-3 (1987).
4. See infra Part V.
5. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism
of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1573, 1589-90 (1996).
6. One partial exception is a forthcoming paper by Dewi 1. Ball, which focuses on the
Justices' limited papers regarding the case. Dewi loan Ball, Williams v. Lee (1959)-50 years later:
A Re-assessment of One of the Most Important cases in the Modern-era of Federal Indian Law,
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/dewi-ball/l.
7. See WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 14.
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product of a deliberate choice to insist that respect for tribal status was nec-
essary to ensure equal treatment and dignity in the modem era.
Williams and the debates leading to it emerged from a unique moment in
time. For over a century, federal Indian policy had revolved around varying
strategies for acquiring tribal land, ending tribal authority, and assimilating
Indian people. In the 1930s and early 1940s, however, the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration briefly embarked on an attempt to strengthen tribal
governments. This effort reversed after World War II. Congress moved to
withdraw responsibility for a number of Indian tribes, along with it recogni-
tion of their special legal status; attempted to extend state jurisdiction over
many more tribes; and ultimately sought to assimilate all Indians into the
broader polity. Although the period is now called the Termination Era, at the
time it was described not as "termination" but as "emancipation,"' some-
thing demanded by the inherent equality of Indian people, particularly in
light of their celebrated service in the war.
There are good reasons to question whether some of these calls for In-
dian equality were anything more than self-serving rhetoric.9 But
termination measures were initially supported by a number of Indians and
tribal leaders.'o Veterans and defense-industry workers returned home to
desperate poverty on reservations that seemed crushed more than ever by
paternalistic federal bureaucracies. At least initially, many Native people
wondered whether doing away with special tribal status altogether might be
the only way to achieve dignity and a decent standard of living.
These tensions were fully present, even exaggerated, for the Navajo
people." In poverty and isolation as well as in military participation and
pride, the Navajos equaled or surpassed any tribe in the country. Perhaps
more than most tribes, the Navajo Nation had chafed under Bureau of Indian
Affairs ("BIA") domination during the New Deal era. In the 1940s, more-
over, Navajos were justifiably dubious that the tribal council and courts
were meaningful representatives of self-government-both had been ini-
tially created by the federal government as a means of achieving federal
ends, and both were still heavily influenced by federal agents.12 It is perhaps
understandable, therefore, that in 1949 the Navajo Tribal Council actually
voted to support a federal bill that would have extended state jurisdiction
over the reservation, with the bill's proponents insisting that state jurisdic-
8. See, e.g., William McK. Chapman, Where Now for the Navajos? Agitation to remove
government trusteeship from Indian holdings alarms this unprepared tribe and its friends, LOOK,
Sept. 22, 1953, at 36.
9. Senator McCarran of Nevada, for example, who condemned federal Indian policy as
lawful discrimination, was a longtime advocate of the claims of white ranchers to Pyramid Lake
Paiute water and land, goals that termination would forward. DONALD L. FixICO, TERMINATION AND
RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960, at 51 (1986).
10. See infra Part II.
I1. See infra Section IRA.
12. See infra notes 163-164, 244-245.
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tion was the best way to achieve full citizenship and equal dignity with other
Americans."
More surprising is that after the president vetoed the bill, the tribe began
a process of tribal institution-building designed to strengthen the tribe
against future assaults on its jurisdiction.14 When Williams first arose in
1952, the council had no doubt that the tribe should assist the family as part
of this battle." As the case was being litigated, the council was devoting
more and more tribal funds to its legal system and increasingly dictating the
terms under which that system served. In 1959, the year the Supreme Court
awarded victory to Paul and Lorena Williams, the tribe formally took con-
'7
trol of its courts from the federal government.
Also concealed by the Court's opinion are the reasons why Williams
struck at the heart of Navajo concerns about outside control. The central fact
for the Williams family, and the chief concern of ordinary Navajos, is not
mentioned in the decision: on filing the suit, Mr. Lee had part of their sheep
herd seized as security against the eventual judgment. Sheep were the eco-
nomic mainstay of the Williams family and of most ordinary Navajos.
They were deeply connected to Navajo culture and domestic relations.20
When the Apache County Sheriff took the sheep, it became a powerful sym-
bol of why tribal institutions were necessary to protect the choices of the
Navajo people about how to live their lives.2'
The case was far less important to the Supreme Court Justices.22 Much
of the oral argument concerned whether the case involved personal or sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, a question to which neither the Court nor the
attorneys had a good answer.23 The Justices appeared surprised to learn that
the Navajo tribe even had its own courts, and most had few suggestions as to
the ultimate opinion.24 But Justice Black, surprisingly, perceived a link be-
tween Williams and Brown v. Board of Education,25 and wrote an opinion
that strongly affirmed not only tribal rights but also the prerogative of the
federal government to protect those rights against state intrusion.26
13. See infra Section IH.B.
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Section 1I.C.
17. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 306-309, 321-329 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 318-320 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 318-320 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 321-322, 325-328 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 400-402, 433-434 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 420-425 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 429-431, 433-434 and accompanying text.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (Black, J.); see also infra notes 434-440,
465-468 and accompanying text.
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Although Williams helped create a legal foundation for tribal self-
determination, its precedent has been decimated by recent cases, and tribal
self-determination itself is again under attack as inconsistent with fairness
and equality." The history of Williams helps illustrate why this attack is
misguided. Just as indigenous peoples successfully argued in securing ratifi-
cation of the United Nations ("UN") Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 2 recognition of tribal rights does not reject Indian
equality, but insists that meaningful equality must be achieved through rec-
ognition of Indian peoples' political status as well.
Part I is a brief note regarding the complexity of claims to equality and
the ways in which equality claims may be made on both sides of contests
regarding tribal rights. Part II provides the broader historical context of Wil-
liams within the debates over Indian policy in the postwar years. Part III
discusses the way in which these debates extended to the Navajo Nation, the
reasons for the Navajo Council's initial acceptance of state jurisdiction, and
its eventual turn toward institutional development and independence. Part IV
turns to the case itself, its impact on the Williams family, the Navajo Na-
tion's involvement in the case, and the arguments made in the Supreme
Court. Part V discusses the influence and ultimate emasculation of Williams
by the Supreme Court, and how that process ties into mistaken concerns
about equality and Indian law.
I. EQUALITIES
It is easy to reject a characterization of the Williams debate as being
about equality at all. Both the decision and the self-determination period
that followed it might instead be seen as the sacrifice of equality for some-
thing else, whether one describes it positively as "sovereignty" or derisively
as "special rights." But describing the debate swirling around Williams in
these terms would distort the ways in which the Native participants them-
selves understood their claims. Words like "sovereignty" appear hardly at all
in this debate, and even then largely in the mouths of non-Indian attorneys;
instead, Native claims were discussed in terms of equality, democracy, free-
21dom, and consent. More fundamentally, calling these claims a rejection of
equality relies on an assumption that equality can be reduced to identical
treatment of all, and overlooks the deep claims to equality at the heart of
demands for self-determination. Without attempting to be a full theoretical
exegesis, this Part briefly explains this claim.30
27. See infra Part V.
28. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (affirming that indige-
nous peoples are equal in dignity and rights to all other peoples and have a right to self-
determination).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 107-108, 125, 136.
30. For an extended elaboration of the concept of equality in tribal claims, see Patrick
Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1311,
1350-66 (1993). More recently, Ninth Circuit judge and federal Indian law expert William Canby
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As Douglas Rae trenchantly points out, the idea of "equality" is almost
meaningless on its own: there are many equalities, and they are often in con-
flict.3 This is necessarily the case so long as individuals have different
32
histories, tastes, needs, endowments, or abilities. Therefore the choice in
modem debates is often not " 'Whether equality?' but 'Which equality?' "
The apparently simple and almost universally embraced concept of
equal opportunity is a famous iteration of this debate, one in which the con-
flict is between the equality of means and the equality of prospects: are
individuals to be afforded equal means to achieve the same ends; or are they
to be afforded an equal chance of achieving those ends? 34 In a world in
which individuals come to the table with different initial assets and abilities,
affording one necessarily means denying the other.35 Despite the passion of
advocates on either side of this conflict, all would reject identical allocation
of either means or prospects as ridiculous. Not even the most fervent advo-
cate of equality of means, for example, would argue that the child who is
bilingual in Mandarin and English and the child who speaks only English
should be taught Mandarin in the same way; no serious advocate of equality
of prospects would suggest that the president of the United States should be
selected by lottery.
The choice between equalities becomes more significant when differ-
ences are the product of membership in groups with different histories and
different political and social standings. Prohibitions on holding government
activities on the Sabbath are less meaningful if the Sabbath of your religion
is different from the day held sacred by those who control the calendar.' An
equal right to choose to go to school with members of your own race means
something very different depending on which race dominates the institutions
that make school-funding decisions and the ranks of social and economic
privilege." More blatantly, a law that provides equal voting rights to the il-
literate if their grandfathers voted results in inequality if certain groups were
denied the vote in generations past.
Equality among entities with distinct political status is a particular form
of group equality. Here, there is wide agreement that equality in treatment of
the individual must be sacrificed for the sake of equal respect for the
also described contemporary tribal legal claims as claims to equality. William N. Canby, The Con-
cept of Equality in Indian Law, 85 WASH. L. REV. 13, 15-16 (2010).
31. DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 2 (1981).
32. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUAL-
ITY xi-xii (1983).
33. RAE ET AL, supra note 31, at 19.
34. See id. at 64-66.
35. See id. at 68-69.
36. See Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (1793) (holding that a Jewish person
could be fined for refusing to appear at jury duty on Saturday).
37. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating such a law because of its
effect of disenfranchising former slaves and their descendants).
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political group with which the individual is affiliated. Thus, few would ar-
gue that Germans resident in Germany should be equally subject to U.S.
laws as U.S. citizens, or that French resident in the United States should be
equally subject to a U.S. draft; such equalities are rejected in favor of giving
the citizens of each country an equal right to govern themselves. Which
groups are entitled to this form of reciprocal respect is a contested question,
as many countries and peoples have been denied self-governance on the
grounds of race, religion, or culture. But that ideas of equality underlie these
rights has been recognized since Franciscus di Victoria first laid the founda-
tions for modern international and Indian law. 9 The founders of the
American Revolution used claims of equality to justify their revolt against
the British;4 0 the UN embraced equality as a basis for self-determination in
the 2007 Declaration on Indigenous People's Rights;4' and foundational lib-
eral theorists recognize and defend equality as a basis for international
relations.42
The quest for a measure of equality in self-governance rights has defined
indigenous people's struggle for hundreds of years.4 ' This struggle is of
course combined with demands for equalities less distinct to political enti-
ties: rights to freedom from discrimination," for example; rights to worship
and live in one's own way;45 and, centrally, rights to possess and control
39. See FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES (1557), re-
printed in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 139 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans.,
1917) (arguing that discovery of the Indians' lands alone did not confer title on the Spanish "any
more than if it had been they who had discovered us"). In general, much of what made de Victoria's
lectures on Indian rights so influential outside their particular subject was his effort to lay down
neutral rules to equally govern peoples of different political and religious allegiances. See id. at
129-149 (elaborating why neither lack of Christianity nor the word of the Pope or Spanish monarch
could authorize violation of indigenous property and political rights).
40. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring that "all Men
are created equal" as a justification for American formation of an independent country).
41. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 28, at I
(affirming that "indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples" and have a right to self-
determination).
42. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 37, 62 (1999) (affirming the right to
mutual respect and equal treatment between peoples). The UN Charter rests on this right, declaring
in Article 1 that one of its fundamental purposes is "[tlo develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." U.N. Charter
art. 1, para. 2.
43. See Canby, supra note 30, at 13 ("[N]othing is more important to the contemporary
tribal Indian than ... an honoring of tribal government at least equally with, say, state govern-
ment."); Macklem, supra note 30, at 1312 (asserting that Indian tribes "yearn to be recognized and
respected as equals in the community of nations").
44. See, e.g., Jeanette Wolfley, Jim Crow, Indian Style: The Disenfranchisement of Native
Americans, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 167 passim (1991) (discussing protests against limitations on
rights to vote).
45. Petalesharo, Address to President James Monroe in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 4, 1822),
in GREAT SPEECHES BY NATIVE AMERICANS 75, 75-77 (Bob Blaisdell ed. 2000) (asking for the right
to continue to live and worship in their own manner); Red Jacket (Sagoyewatha), Address in Answer
to Missionary Cram (1805), in GREAT SPEECHES BY NATIVE AMERICANS, supra, at 41, 42 ("Brother,
we do not wish to destroy your religion or take it from you; we only want to enjoy our own.").
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one's property.46 But both Native individuals and their tribes have argued
(with much historical evidence to support them) that these more classically
individual rights are often best realized if their groups are accorded self-
governance. Indeed, assertions of the individual rights of American Indians
have often been the guise for denying their communities and their members
the very cultural, religious, property, and self-governance rights which
equality might otherwise seem to demand.47
This is not to say that self-governance is the only or most appropriate
form of equality for Native people. As the next section discusses, Native
people themselves debated whether giving up a tribal existence in favor of
assimilation might be the best way to achieve goals that all agreed were ne-
cessary, such as education and freedom from poverty. But after considering,
and even living through, the alternatives, Indian communities unified behind
continued self-governance as a necessary part of respecting themselves as
equal, rights-bearing individuals and furthering their quest to improve their
41lives. If we agree that a measure of choice and consent are elements of the
equality our society chooses to protect, then this considered choice must be
a relevant factor in debates over Indian status.
II. CONTESTS OVER INDIAN EQUALITY IN THE POSTWAR YEARS
The 1940s and 1950s saw consensus about the need for, but contest re-
garding the meaning of, Indian equality. Despite debate whether equality
meant ending the special status of tribal members or respecting tribal auton-
omy, the former idea came to dominate federal Indian policy, leading to
what is now known as the Termination Era. And although termination is
now seen as misguided and paternalistic at best, and hypocritical and self-
serving at worst, many tribal leaders and individuals initially supported
termination's core elements. By the mid-1950s, however, Indian opinion had
almost uniformly repudiated termination. This Part describes this progres-
sion.
By the twentieth century, American Indians had experienced centuries of
efforts to separate them from their tribes, their cultures, and their lands.
46. See, e.g., 2 AM. ST. PAPERS INDIAN AFF. 571 (Dec. 11, 1824) ("[W]e feel an affection
for the land in which we were born; we wish our bones to rest by the side of our fathers. .. . [W]e
must positively decline the proposal of a removal beyond the Mississippi, or the sale of any more of
our territory.").
47. See, e.g., Fixico, supra note 9, at 51 (describing Senator McCarran's efforts to remove
the Indian Commerce Clause from the Constitution as a means to end the enslavement of the Indian,
while McCarran was working to have Paiute lands transferred to white ranchers); Henry L. Dawes,
Solving the Indian Pmblem, in AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE
"FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 1880-1900, at 27, 29-30 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973) [hereinafter
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS] (stating that policies of the forcible allotment of land
away from the Indians were necessary to "treat [the Indian] as an individual" and "lift him up into
citizenship and manhood"); Richard H. Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites, in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra, at 260, 260-61 (arguing that a coercive system of
boarding schools designed to "kill[] the Indian" in the race was necessary for system of "associa-
tion, equality, amalgamation").
48. See infra Part V.
June 2011]1 1471
Michigan Law Review
Anglo-American governments had acquired all but a small fraction of Indian
4915lands, weakened or destroyed traditional governance systems,so and un-
dermined families by removing children to boarding schools that sought to
turn children against their traditional languages and lifestyles.
The Indian New Deal period of the 1930s and early 1940s saw a brief
break from this trajectory, as federal policymakers recognized that past ef-
forts had only impoverished the Indians and had left them ever more under
arbitrary state and local control. But both the mechanics of the Indian New
Deal and the political backlash against it undermined its ability to make pos-
itive change in Indian lives. By the 1940s, Indian people were desperately
poor and were saddled with federally dominated tribal governments. For
generations, moreover, they had been the targets of messages that it was
Indian culture, and not American colonialism, that created this situation."
While both Indians and their tribes articulated their own interests and mes-
sages, they had few attractive choices for improving their lives.
World War II had a powerful impact in this context. Indian people had
served in the war in great numbers, with perhaps a greater participation rate
56
than any other ethnic group in the United States. While some Indians re-
sisted the draft, arguing that the U.S. citizenship involuntarily thrust upon
them was invalid,57 most enlisted voluntarily, even enthusiastically." Unlike
African-Americans, Indians served in integrated units," and their contribu-
tions were celebrated by military commanders, the BIA, and the national
press.6 The praise heaped upon Indian soldiers often depended on savage
warrior stereotypes: commentators claimed, for example, that "[a] red man
49. See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.01, at 6 (Nell
Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis rev. ed. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 COHEN].
50. ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 103-05 (2d ed. 2010); STEPHEN CORNELL, THE
RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 56-58, 88-89 (1988).
51. ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 50, at 126-28.
52. Id. at 130-36.
53. Id. at 140-42.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74, 153-155, 159-164.
55. In the Navajo Nation, for example, a sign at the entrance to the Ganado Mission
School read, "Tradition is the Enemy of Progress." PETER IVERSON, DINt: A HISTORY OF THE NAVA-
jos 201 (2002).
56. ALISON R. BERNSTEIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND WORLD WAR II: TOWARD A NEW ERA
IN INDIAN AFFAIRS 43 (1991) (describing a claim by the New York Times that Indian service "ex-
ceed[ed] the percentage participation by the male population as a whole . .1').
57. See, e.g., Ex parte Green, 123 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1941) (rejecting challenge by an
Onondaga man that the treaty prevented his draft); BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 27-36 (discussing
Papago, Hopi, Zuni, and Iroquois resistance to the draft).
58. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 42.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., American Indian Downs 2 Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1944, at 6 (reporting on
"Hiawatha Nohawk, full-blooded American Indian flier"); Indian Chief Leaps Ashore 'To Return
Columbus Visit', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1943, at 5; Indians Honor M'Arthur, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 14,
1943, at 32.
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will risk his life for a white as dauntlessly as his ancestor lifted a paleface's
scalp," that Indians "can smell a snake yards away," and that they benefited
from a natural "enthusiasm for fighting."6 ' But both their actual accom-
plishments in war and the popular appeal of having the first Americans fight
on the American side generated a new sense of the capacity of Indian people
61and of American obligations to them.
American engagement with international economic development and the
ideological battle with Russia also informed federal Indian policy after the
war.63 Opponents of federal termination measures argued that respect for
Indian choices and rights was part of the respect for minority groups neces-
sary to win the struggle against communism. Proponents used the same
arguments to advocate for ending the special legal status of Indians, and
condemned the previous administration's support for tribal governance as
unmitigated socialism.
For Native people as well, the postwar period was one of new activism
in achieving equality. Returning veterans and defense-industry workers
came home with more confidence in their ability to compete with non-
Indians. At the same time, federal support for the tribal role during the
Indian New Deal had energized tribal leaders in their negotiations with the
federal government. Moreover, in its waning years, the New Deal admini-
stration had amplified the power of these leaders by facilitating the creation
of the National Congress of American Indians ("NCAI") in 1944, the first
institution representing tribes from across the country.6 These developments
left American Indians increasingly frustrated with the poverty still existing
on their reservations and with federal paternalism and control over Indian
choices.
Changes in federal institutions governing Indian affairs affected Native
perceptions as well. The BIA had lost significant funding during the war
even as other nonwar funding increased.67 Funds for health care, education,
employment, and economic development all began to dry up.' The
61. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 45, 54-55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 78-2091, at 14 (1944) (stating that those who had fought for
Uncle Sam should not be denied freedom on reservations at home).
63. See PAUL C. ROSIER, SERVING THEIR COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND
PATRIOTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 108-160 (2009). For extended treatment of the ways
foreign policy and the Cold War impacted federal policy toward African Americans and civil rights,
see CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS: 1944-1955 (2003), and MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
64. See, e.g., Eleanor Roosevelt, Op-Ed., My Day, Oct. 5, 1949, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-erpapers/myday/displaydoc.cfm?-Y=1949&_f=md001402; ROSIER, supra
note 63, at 158.
65. ROSIER, supra note 63, at 132.
66. KENNETH R. PHILP, TERMINATION REVISITED: AMERICAN INDIANS ON THE TRAIL TO
SELF-DETERMINATION, 1933-1953, at 13-15 (1999).
67. 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 1004-05 (1984).
68. Id.
1473June 2011 ]
Michigan Law Review
BIA-never the most efficient of agencies-was even less able to offer
meaningful assistance, and was even more than ever a source of frustrating
red tape.6 For many Native people, a continued relationship with the federal
government seemed to offer little and take much.
The Indian "emancipation" policy was the result.0 Beginning in the
1940s, Congress and the executive came to agree that equality for American
Indians depended on freeing them from federal supervision. The seeds of
this policy were planted as early as December 1944 when the House re-
leased a special report, "An Investigation to Determine Whether the
Changed Status of the Indian Requires a Revision of the Law and Regula-
tions Affecting the American Indian."" The report sought to address the
factors that had slowed "the progress of the Indian toward the goal which
this committee believes is rightfully his-to take his place in the white
man's community on the white man's level and with the white man's oppor-
tunity and security status."" Invoking Indian military service, the report
demanded: "Will the Indian who has recently doffed the uniform of Uncle
Sam be willing to don the blanket of his forebears? This committee doubts
that he will. This committee most vehemently denies that he should.""
The report condemned many of the inequities most resented by Indian
people, including the denial of the vote to Indians in several states and the
pervasive federal control of tribal action.74 It decried the "indescribably bad"
living conditions on reservations and their impact on American claims to
bring freedom and opportunity to foreign lands." But it also endorsed ideas
that would be core to the termination policy, such as transferring federal
responsibilities to states and ending tax restrictions on reservation lands of
Indians who were deemed ready for "full citizenship." Its discussion of
education, moreover, suggested ending the distinct political and cultural
status of Indians altogether: "The goal of Indian education should be to
make the Indian child a better American rather than to equip him simply to
be a better Indian" and should cease "perpetuating the Indian as a special-
status individual rather than preparing him for independent citizenship."
69. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 78-2091, at 3 (1944) (reporting on the "charges, heard on
almost every reservation, that the Indian Service is tied down by red tape and that, in particular, too
many matters must be referred for decision to the central office in Chicago, or to the Secretary of the
Interior in Washington").
70. Felix S. Cohen, Breaking Faith with Our First Americans, INDIAN TRUTH, Mar.-Apr.
1948, at 1, 7 ("'Emancipating the Indian' has become the catchword. . .
71. H.R. REP. No. 78-2091.
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 14. Interestingly, one of the four members of the committee was Antonio Fer-
nandez, id. at 19, the New Mexico congressman who would later propose extending state
jurisdiction over the Navajo Reservation. See infra Section B.B.
74. H.R. REP. No. 78-2091, at 3-7, 15-16.
75. Id. at 12.
76. See id. at 15-16.
77. Id. at 9.
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Such arguments recalled the nineteenth century boarding schools designed
to "[k]ill the Indian in him, and save the man."8 The report and its rhetoric
captured the core beliefs behind termination.
Many termination measures were taken at the request of Native groups
or with the intent of correcting inequalities. In 1946, for example, Congress
enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act 9 in response to a central de-
mand of the newly formed NCAI.so Prior to the act, tribes and Indians were
excluded from the sovereign immunity waiver of the Tucker Act, and there-
fore had no ability to bring claims against the United States without the
passage of a special jurisdictional act." In 1953, Congress finally repealed
federal laws prohibiting Indians from purchasing alcohol82 and guns.83 In
1954, Congress transferred the Indian Health Service from the Department
of the Interior to the Public Health Service84 to ensure that medical care for
Indians would meet the standards of care provided to other Americans.
Even from the beginning, however, some federal actions cast doubt on
governmental willingness to respect Indian equality and choices in the face
of conflicting demands. The aggressive public works projects of the postwar
years, for example, took vast swaths of Indian land against the will or treaty
86
rights of Native peoples. Dillon Myer, commissioner of Indian Affairs be-
tween 1950 and 1953, generated even more fervent protests against heavy-
handed government action. He created a firestorm beginning in 1950 by
issuing new restrictions on tribal contracts with attorneys and by rejecting
contracts with some of the attorneys that were most passionate in opposing
federal policies." Myer went further the next year, mandating commissioner
approval before a tribe could use its own tribal funds to send a delegation to
Washington,8 9 an effective means to quiet dissenting voices. His critics, not-
ing that he had served as director of Japanese internment during the war,
said he was trying to imprison the Indians as well.
Indian people, tribes, and their advocates were uniform in opposing fed-
eral land grabs and efforts to stifle tribal political and legal advocacy. Paiute
opponents to the attorney contract restrictions declared them an attempt to
78. Richard H. Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites, in AMERICANIZING
THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 47, at 261.
79. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049.
80. See PHILP, supra note 66, at 20-28.
81. 2005 COHEN, supra note 49, at 443.
82. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 502, § 2, 67 Stat. 586.
83. Indian Bills Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1953, at A5.
84. Act of Aug. 5, 1954, ch. 658, § 1, 68 Stat. 674.
85. 2005 COHEN, supra note 49, at 1377-78.
86. See, e.g., THOMAS CLARKIN, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND JOHN-
SON ADMINISTRATIONS, 1961-1969, at 50-54 (2001).
87. See PHILP, supra note 66, at 87-88, 99, 130-39.
88. See id. at 111-13.
89. See id. at 117.
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undermine "fundamental rights of political liberty and local self-
government,"90 while a San Ildefonso Pueblo man who had worked on the
wartime atomic bomb project declared that if Indians "could be trusted to
work on the war's greatest secret, they were trustworthy enough to be al-
lowed a greater measure of self-rule."9' Equality-based arguments were also
used against a measure taking lands claimed by Alaska Natives, condemning
the action as "enslavement" 92 and a product of the "feeling that Indians are
not quite human, and certainly not fit to own their own homes, cut their own
trees, or mine their own lands."93
At least initially, however, tribes and Indian people did not uniformly
oppose general termination policies. Leading Native Americans wrote edito-
rials advocating the end of the special federal-tribal relationship, extension
of state jurisdiction over reservations, and removal of trust status from In-
dian land.94 Even the NCAI was initially conflicted about termination
measures. By the mid-1950s the NCAI would become one of the leading
voices against the Termination Policy." During the 1940s, however, some
NCAI representatives, chafing under the bureaucratic domination of the BIA
and working to enable the members of its constituent tribes to enjoy the
general American standard of living, believed that termination and the dis-
tribution of tribal property to individuals was the best way to go. 96 Napoleon
Bonaparte Johnson, the first president of NCAI, wrote Representative Fer-
nandez a note praising him for his work in inserting the state jurisdiction
amendment into the Navajo-Hopi bill." In January 1953, shortly before
Congress would adopt termination as its official policy," NCAI's member
tribes lobbied for the president of the Interstate Indian Council, which advo-
cated "the earliest possible withdrawal of the Federal Government from
Indian management in favor of the states," to become the next commissioner
90. Id. at 119 (interal quotation marks omitted).
91. Anthony Leviero, Indian War Whoop Marks Hearings: Sessions Opened By Chapman,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1952, at 9.
92. See Kimmis Hendrick, American Indians Protest 'Enslavement' Under Paternalistic
U.S. Rule: Bureaucracy Hit; Near-Famine Cited, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 3, 1947, § 2, at 1.
93. Cohen, supra note 70, at 6.
94. See, e.g., Will Rogers, Jr., Starvation without Representation, LOOK, Feb. 15, 1948, at
36, 42 ("As rapidly as possible, Indian tribes should be released from wardship; and as rapidly as
possible, they should be turned over to state jurisdiction."); Hendrick, supra note 92 (discussing
Tsianina Redfeather's advocacy for measures to prepare Indians to be "free citizens:' including
liquidation of the BIA and creating councils for each reservation composed of equal parts white and
Indian members).
95. See CLARKIN, supra note 86, at 10-11 (discussing the NCAI's important role in fight-
ing termination).
96. See PHILP, supra note 66, at 86-87, 171.
97. Letter from N.B. Johnson, President, Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians, to Antonio M. Fer-
nandez, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (August 15, 1949) (on file with the National
Museum of the American Indian in the NCAI Archives, Series 6, Box 113, Folder 117).
98. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (enacted).
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of Indian Affairs.9 It was only when faced with the reality of termination, in
which federal policy would be made without regard to Native voices, that
tribes and the NCAI unified around continued distinctive tribal status.
Congressional hearings regarding Public Law 280, which extended state
jurisdiction over reservation Indians, provide a nice lens on the diversity of
opinions in Indian country during this period and the way that both sides
used the rhetoric of equality. The House Subcommittee on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs held hearings in 1952 and 1953 on a bill that initially only
concerned California, but was intended to serve as a prototype for other
states.'" Subcommittee Chair Wesley D'Ewart opened the February 1952
hearing by reading complaints by non-Indians about drunken lawlessness on
reservations and then stating, "Throughout my years in Congress I have
worked toward placing our Indians on an equal basis with the white man. I
firmly believe the Indians should not be discriminated against."'o' The attor-
ney for the Interior Department next opposed state jurisdiction, arguing that
Indians would face discrimination in unfamiliar state courts.102 Similarly,
Thomas Yallup of the Yakima Nation testified that his tribe opposed state
jurisdiction because of the prejudice many still bore against Indians, and
because it felt that federal law and order, along with the Yakimas' own tribal
customs, laws, and traditions, were working for the Yakima."
Paul Willis, in contrast, read a statement on behalf of some forty bands
of California Indians, urging Congress to "either approve this bill and thus
recognize California Indians as human beings entitled to equality under the
law, or ... perpetuate and make permanent the iron rule of the Indian Bu-
reau."'0 There were pressing reasons to avoid that "iron rule."' 5 A bill had
recently been introduced to authorize BIA employees to carry arms, enter
and search Indian homes, and make warrantless arrests to enforce BIA regu-
lations. This expansion of the use of force beyond trained law enforcement
99. Gladwin Hill, Indians Are Split on Role in Nation: Speculation on Choice of New
Bureau Head Stirs West, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1953, at 87.
100. See State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235, and
H.R. 3624 Before the H. Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Interior and Insular Affairs Comm., 82d
Cong. (1952) [hereinafter Legal Jurisdiction Hearings]; To Amend Title 18, United States Code,
Entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure," in Certain Respects: Hearing on H.R. 5476, H.R. 6035,
H.R. 6036, and H.R. 6695 Before the H. Subcomm. No. 2 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong.
(1952) [hereinafter 1952 Hearings on Title 18]; House of Representatives, To Amend Title 18, Unit-
ed States Code, Entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure": Hearings on H.R. 1063 Before the H.
Subcomm. On Indian Affairs of the Interior and Insular Affairs Comm., 82d Cong. (1953) (holding
hearings on June 15, 1953, June 19, 1953, and July 15, 1953 to discuss the bill).
101. Legal Jurisdiction Hearings (Feb. 28-29, 1952), supra note 100, at 5-10 (statement of
Wesley A. D'Ewart, H. Rep. from Mont.).
102. See id. at 11 (discussing letter from Dale Doty, Assistant Secretary of the Interior).
103. Id. at 84.
104. Id. at 61, 63.
105. Id. at 63.
106. Legal Jurisdiction Hearings, supra note 100, at 24-28 (June 13, 1952).
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officers and beyond enforcement of criminal laws was opposed by all those
testifying on behalf of Indians.io0
Despite these disagreements, the dominant sentiment of Indian tribes
and their advocates was that state jurisdiction should not be extended with-
out tribal consent via community referendum. For Robert Yellowtail of the
Crow Tribe, this "attempt to force State control of law and order without a
word from the Indians themselves . .. gives the lie to all past pretenses of
the rights of minority groups to exercise rights of self-determination."'os
Even the Daughters of the American Revolution chimed in, writing that if
"laws in general are subject to the will of the people, then every American
Indian tribal group is entitled to voice their opinion" on state jurisdiction.'"
With general reassurance that state jurisdiction would not be extended over
Indian tribes without their consent,"o however, tribal attention turned to the
search and seizure bill and the repeal of federal liquor restrictions.
Congress unexpectedly violated the demand for meaningful consent in
the summer of 1953. The subcommittee had already submitted the Califor-
nia bill to Congress," but had asked Commissioner Myer to recommend
other states that could be granted jurisdiction. After Minnesota, Wisconsin,
and Oregon expressed willingness to accept jurisdiction, they were all added
on." 2 The subcommittee also decided without notice and with little debate to
approve a provision allowing any state to assume jurisdiction if it subse-
quently so chose."'3 Although the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), NCAI, Association on American Indian Affairs, and tribal repre-
sentatives all joined in calling for a veto," 4 President Eisenhower signed
Public Law 280 on August 15, 1953, describing it as "still another step in
granting complete political equality to all Indians in our nation."" 5
Nor was Public Law 280 the only surprise that August. On August 1,
Congress had approved House Concurrent Resolution 108, expressing "the
107. Apparently, it was also roundly condemned in the press. On June 13, 1953, Felix Co-
hen read portions of editorials from the papers in Louisiana, Indiana, Texas, Mississippi, and New
Mexico, referring to the measure variously as a "Gestapo Power," "like something out of Soviet,
Russia [sic]," and a "bald-faced attempt by the Indian Bureau to seize dictatorial powers" and deny
the "first Americans" a privilege with "deep roots in American civil ights." 1952 Hearings on Title
18, supra note 100, at 25-26 (June 13, 1952).
108. Legal Jurisdiction Hearings, supra note 100, at 94 (Feb. 28, 1952).
109. Id. at 95.
110. Id. at 25.
111. 99 CONG. REc. 140 (1953).
112. See To Amend Title 18, United States Code, Entitled "Crimes and Criminal Proce-
dure": Hearing on H.R. 1063 Before the H. Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Interior and Insular
Affairs Comm., 83d Cong. 2-3, 17 (July 15, 1953).
113. Id. at 3-4; see also In Fairness to the Indian, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1953, at 30 (calling
this "no way to pass legislation vitally affecting a minority group").
114. In Fairness to the Indian, supra note 113, at 30; New Pleas are Filed for Indian Bill
Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1953.
115. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Relating to State Jurisdiction Over Cas-
es Arising on Indian Reservations, 1953 PuB. PAPERs 564 (Aug. 15, 1953).
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policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the
territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to
the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of
the United States," and declaring the sense of Congress that all of the Indian
tribes within California, Florida, New York, and Texas, along with five other
tribes in various states, "should be freed from Federal supervision and con-
trol and from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to
Indians."' Although the resolution itself had no independent legal effect
and tribes were consulted before termination acts were passed with respect
to individual tribes, the manner of consultation only underscored the lack of
concern for Indian choices regarding their fate. Some tribes targeted for
termination had won large judgments in the Court of Claims; the govern-
ment threatened to withhold the judgment funds unless they agreed to
termination.'1 In other tribes the clear majority of the tribe had objected to
termination, but all that was reported was the support of smaller groups of
tribal members."'
The result has been described as a "major shot in the supratribal arm.""9
NCAI called an emergency meeting for February 25, 1954, and more than
fifty tribes traveled from across the country to participate.20 Although
NCAI's leaders had debated whether complete federal withdrawal was the
best means to achieve Indian liberty and equality in the initial postwar pe-
riod, they now saw self-determination as an equality right, querying,
"Shouldn't Indians have the same right of self-determination that our gov-
ernment has stated . . . is the inalienable right of peoples in far parts of the
world?"'2' By the end of 1954, the NCAI had become such a strong advo-
cate against termination that the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs
tried to dismiss its criticism as that of "professional Indians," whose "high
116. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (enacted).
117. See, e.g., R. WARREN METCALF, TERMINATION's LEGACY: THE DISCARDED INDIANS OF
UTAH 87 (2002) (discussing the threats to Utes regarding the distribution of claims funds); Stephen
J. Herzberg, The Menominee Indians: Termination to Restoration, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 143, 160
(1978) (describing threat that the Menominee would not receive a per capita distribution unless they
consented to termination); see also Indians Win Victory-Persuade US. to Let Them Use Funds in
Trusteeship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1955, at 21 (describing defeat of attempt to make Fort Berthold
Indians consent to termination in order to receive tribal funds).
118. See PHILP, supra note 66, at 159-62 (discussing responses by the Klamath Tribe and
California Indians); see generally Gladwin Hill, American Indian Flexes Muscles-Tribal Conven-
tion Reveals His Growing Social and Political Awareness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1959, at 57
(discussing training sessions at NCAI conferences in which delegates were taught that "[w]ith Indi-
ans, silence is a way of expressing disapproval or disagreement[, whereas in] the white man's world
... if you disagree you should speak up").
119. CORNELL, supra note 50, at 124.
120. See CLARKIN, supra note 86, at 10; Indians Call Protest Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1954, at 34.
121. ROSIER, supra note 63, at 174.
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powered propaganda machine" "almost completely drowned out" the voice
of the "real Indians." 22
Over the course of the 1950s, the American press continued to report
termination decisions as historic measures freeing the Indians,' and their
opponents as advocating "preservation of basket-weaving in the face of
pauperism."' 24 Indian people, however, were ever more unified in their resis-
tance to such measures, seeing the measures not as paths to equality but as
dictatorial attempts to acquire their property and forcibly assimilate them.125
Far from emancipation, they increasingly agreed that termination was its
opposite, a violation of "the national principle of majority rule" and of the
"sustaining source of strength to Indian democracy." 26 These protests
slowed the implementation of termination, and by 1970 led to the self-
determination policy that continues today.127
III. NAVAJO DEBATE AND TRANSFORMATION
The transformation of Navajo opinion between the consideration of the
Fernandez Amendment and the celebration of Williams v. Lee forms a per-
fect microcosm of the tensions in Indian opinion nationally. Desperately
poor and only beginning to have an effective voice in federal policy, many
Navajo representatives initially accepted that full integration was the only
way to achieve equality in American society. Over the course of the 1940s
and 1950s, however, Navajos came to focus on tribal institution-building as
the best way to improve living standards and secure meaningful control over
their destinies. Williams v. Lee became a part of this battle to preserve the
independence of tribal institutions. The Court's opinion both reflected the
success of these institution-building efforts and laid the groundwork for fu-
ture tribal self-determination.
122. Slash in U.S. Rule of Indians Urged: Group in House Would Strip Bureau of Major
Functions, Assign Some to States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1954, at 29.
123. See, e.g., Austin C. Wehrwein, Wisconsin Plans an Indian County: Menominee Tribe
Would End Its Federal Ties and Develop Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 21, 1959, at 70 (calling
termination one of the Menominee tribe's "greatest victories").
124. Gladwin Hill, Indians Gaining Citizens'Status: Interstate Council Tackles Problems of
Shift From Federal 'Wardship', N.Y TIMES, Oct. 9, 1955, at 60; see also U.S. Reverses Trend, Eas-
ing Indian Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1954, at 63.
125. See, e.g., Donald Janson, Indians Protest 'Meddling' By U.S.: Oklahoma Pow-Wow
Assails the Relocation of Youths, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 3, 1957, at 119 (reporting on a unanimous resolu-
tion by sixty-two tribes gathered at an NCAI conference against termination policy).
126. Gladwin Hill, Indian Congress Opens in Arizona: Delegates of On-Reservation Tribes
Urged to Increase Political Participation, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 8, 1959, at 57.
127. See generally Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS
564 (July 8, 1970) (statement by President Richard M. Nixon declaring policy of self-determination
without termination); CLARKIN, supra note 86, at xii, 9-11, 281 (discussing development of self-
determination policy under the shadow of termination in the 1960s).
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A. The Navajo Nation in the Wake of World War II
In the wake of World War II, the Navajo Nation was a stark example of
the hardships of Indian life. Spanning portions of Arizona, New Mexico,
and Utah, the Navajo reservation was the largest and one of the most iso-
lated reservations, a place where only dirt roads traversed an area the size of
West Virginia. Trachoma, tuberculosis, dysentery, and other diseases largely
extinguished elsewhere in American society were common on the reserva-
tion. 12 Despite treaty promises of education, schools were available for just
one quarter of school-age children. 129Eighty-five percent of the reservation
population was illiterate, 30 and the significant majority spoke only Navajo.
The Navajo Nation had also become one of the most visible tribes dur-
ing the war years. The Navajo government enthusiastically endorsed the
war, enacting several resolutions affirming Navajo loyalty, threatening pun-
132
ishment of any "un-American movement,""' pledging readiness to serve,
and even urging the Navajo people to cut down on traditional gatherings to
"conserve food, automobile tires and gasoline for our country."'33 After most
Navajos seeking to enlist were rejected because they didn't speak English,
Navajo Chairman J.C. Morgan protested, "It's discriminatory ... Navajos
are extremely patriotic and want to serve."3 4 Ultimately the local board cre-
ated a remedial English training unit to accommodate them.'3 ' The Navajo
language proved an important tool in the war when it was adapted into an
unbreakable code, and as many as 400 Navajo Marines were trained as
"code talkers" and assigned to units throughout the Pacific.136
128. See, e.g., Navajo Life Span is Put at 20 Years: U.S. Aide Tells House Unit of Average
Tied to Health Hazards on Reservation, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1954, at 27.
129. FRANK WATERS, MASKED GODS: NAVAJO AND PUEBLO CEREMONIALISM 151 (1950).
130. Proceedings of the Meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council, 18, 46 (June 8-11, 1949)
[hereinafter Navajo Minutes]. I consulted copies of the minutes at both the Navajo Nation Records
Department in Window Rock, Arizona and the National Archives in Washington, D.C. in Record
Group 75, Central classified files 1940-1957 (.054, Tribal Council Minutes).
131. Navajo Tribal Council, Loyalty Pledge to United States, Res. No. CJ-5-40, June 4,
1940, in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-1951, at 376 (1952).
132. Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Patriotism, Reaffirm Allegiance to United States
(Jan. 12, 1942), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-1951, supra note 131, at 377.
133. Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Patriotism, Conservation of Food (June 25,
1942), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-195 1, supra note 131, at 379.
134. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 34.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 48-49. Philip Johnston, a missionaries' son who had developed the code and
supervised the code talker unit, later besieged the BIA and Congress with letters berating the gov-
emnment for failing to live up to its responsibilities to the Navajo. See Letter from Philip Johnston to
Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, House Comm. on Indian Affairs (May 12, 1946) (on file with the
National Museum of the American Indian in the NCAI Archives, Box 113); Letter from Philip
Johnston to Norris Poulson, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 30, 1946) (on file
with the National Museum of the American Indian in the NCAI Archives, Box 113); Letter from
Philip Johnston to William A. Brophy, Comm'r of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Sept.
23, 1946) (on file with the National Museum of the American Indian in the NCAI Archives, Box
113).
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The soldiers returned with a new sense of confidence in themselves and
their abilities, and soon became a significant force in Navajo politics. Ser-
geant Abner Jackson reported arriving for duty in Scotland speaking only
Navajo and a little Spanish; by the time he returned home, he had served on
two continents and spoke not only English but French, Italian, and Ger-
man.17 Peter MacDonald, who served four terms as Chairman of the Navajo
Nation beginning in 1971, frequently told a story of the impact on him
when, in boot camp, an illiterate white private asked MacDonald to read a
letter for him: "It really changed my attitude. I decided, hey, these guys
don't have any secret endowment, as they said they do. They're not any bet-
ter than I am. I felt very proud."'
But increasing confidence in dealing in the white world enhanced seg-
mentation in Navajo society. Navajos who had attended boarding schools
and could read, write, and speak English had already organized as the "Re-
turned Students Association" to keep alive the values learned in school.
Beginning in the 1930s, they had gained significant representation on the
Navajo Tribal Council.'39 Although the non-English-speaking Navajos in
tribal government represented a far greater portion of the Navajo population,
they often spoke with diffidence about their ability to understand and con-
tribute to council business. 40 Many Navajo veterans were impatient with
existing leaders, campaigning for a thorough investigation of the tribal
courts, which they claimed were "not in sympathy with the more modem
thinking of the more educated members of the Navajo Indian Tribe,"' 4' and
for the lifting of trust restrictions that prevented them from mortgaging their
lands.142
The Navajo people had also suffered from federal bureaucracy under the
Indian New Deal. Although the New Deal had initially brought valuable
'43
Conservation Corps projects and jobs to the Navajo Reservation, the pe-
riod soon became inalterably associated with the stock reduction policy.
When Commissioner Collier and the Indian New Deal reached the Navajo
Nation in the 1930s, sheep were at the heart of both Navajo economy and
culture. As one Navajo councilmember declared, as the "good old dollar"
was the "substance of life" for white people, sheep and goats were the "sub-
stance of life" for the Navajos, both a source of prestige and the basis of
137. WATERS, supra note 129, at 149.
138. Sandy Tolan, Showdown at Window Rock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, at SM28.
139. DONALD L. PARMAN, THE NAVAJOS AND THE NEW DEAL 38-39 (1976).
140. See, e.g., Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 15 (Jan. 5, 1953) (statement of Tohonnie
Nez); id. at 169 (Jan. 9, 1953) (statement of Yellowman); see also Allan G. Harper, Area Dir., Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, Remarks to Navajo Tribal Council 3 (Feb. 25, 1954) [hereinafter Remarks of
Allan G. Harper] (transcript available from the NCAI Archives in the National Museum of the
American Indian Archive Center) (decrying the cleavage that had opened between the so-called
educated and uneducated).
141. Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Law and Order, Proposed Study of System (Feb.
25, 1948), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-1951, supra note 131, at 216.
142. Paul Jones, Guest Ed., THE AMERINDIAN, July-Aug. 1956, at 2.
143. PARMAN, supra note 139, at 34-35.
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survival.'" Wool and lambs were traded for other goods, and wool was dyed,
woven, and sold as much-celebrated Navajo rugs. Sheep were also essential
to Navajo family life; children herded sheep under the supervision of the
family, part of the increase of the herd was set aside for the children's patri-
mony on marriage, and the extended family returned to the homestead to
join in moving and shearing the herd.145
By the 1930s, however, sheep, goats, cattle, and horses had desperately
overgrazed the arid Navajo lands.'" New Deal soil-erosion experts reported
to Collier that the land could not sustain the present herds.' 47 Beginning in
1933, the BIA began implementing stock reduction across the reservation.148
Eventually, families were given grazing permits limiting them to a certain
number of "sheep units," with animals that caused more erosion-goats,
cows, and horses-taking multiple sheep units.149 Excess stock was to be
sold for a fixed amount to government agents. For families who had built
their lives and their sense of themselves around their stock, this loss cut to
the core. One man told the stock wranglers, "You people are indeed heart-
less. You have now killed me. You have cut off my arms. You have cut off
my legs. You have taken my head off. There is nothing left for me."'50 The
man soon fell ill, and died the following spring.
Stock reduction also had a painful economic impact. Although the plan
was to cut primarily from the wealthy families with vast herds, such families
were politically powerful and were able to successfully pressure those with
small herds to reduce stock proportionately.152 Families who could no longer
sustain themselves on their herds became dependent on wage labor, gov-
ernment welfare, and, importantly for Williams v. Lee, credit from local
trading posts.' While wages from defense work made up for the loss during
the war, this income disappeared after the war.5 4 Hit by harsh droughts and
severe blizzards beginning in 1947, Navajos froze and starved. 55 Traders
were asked for credit for flour and other supplies that they knew their
144. Id. at 55.
145. Id. at 66.
146. Some argue, however, that water diversion from the construction of the Hoover Dam
was the underlying cause. DAVID E. WILKINS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 85 (rev. ed.
2003).
147. See PARMAN, supra note 139, at 37-38.
148. Id. at 48-49.
149. See id. at 101.
150. PETER NABOKOV, NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS FROM PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-2000, at 330 (Penguin Books, rev. ed. 1999)
(1978).
151. Id.
152. See PARMAN, supra note 139, at 63.
153. See id. at 91 (noting that stock reduction created a dependence on wage labor).
154. See Press Release, Office of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Navajo Relief
Need Urgent (Oct. 21, 1947).
155. WATERS, supra note 129, at 150.
1483June 2011]
Michigan Law Review
customers would not soon be able to repay. Ralph Evans, a trader from Shi-
prock, testified before Congress that a woman had come into his trading
post asking for a small shawl but had no money to pay for it.156 Told she
could not have it, she began crying; her baby had died that day, and she
wanted the shawl for a shroud. "She left with the shawl," Evans said. 57
The crisis of poverty of the late 1940s brought national attention to the
Navajo Nation. Magazines and newspapers across America bemoaned the
suffering of the Navajo people. Life, Look, and Time carried lengthy articles
and full-page photo spreads showing hungry, sick Navajos in homes without
heat, electricity, or running water.' Charitable organizations like the Red
Cross and the American Friends Service Committee sent supplies and vol-
unteers to provide relief.'59 Congress appropriated millions to alleviate the
crisis and began planning a long-term response through the Navajo-Hopi
Rehabilitation Act. The Navajo Nation became a national poster child for
the failure of the federal Indian policy.
There were also good reasons for Navajo people to associate tribal insti-
tutions with federal domination. Tribal police forces and courts had been
created with federal encouragement in the nineteenth century to help im-
plement federal policies and prevent Navajos from raiding off-reservation
lands. 1o The Navajo Tribal Council itself had been created by the federal
government in 1923 to create a single voice for five largely independent
sections of the reservation and thereby overcome objections by Northern
Navajos to drilling for oil on their land.1' The council approved each of the
stock reductions, in part because of threats that proposed expansions of the
Navajo Reservation would not go through without the reductions.162 Tribal
courts and police helped to implement the policy, punishing those who re-
fused to comply with it.163
These institutions remained significantly controlled by the federal gov-
ernment. Until the 1950s, the federal superintendent for the Navajo agency
of the BIA drafted the tribal council's agenda and even sat on the podium
during tribal council meetings alongside the chairman and vice-chairman for
156. Rehabilitation of Navajo and Hopi Indians: Hearing on S. 2363 Before the S. Sub-
comm. of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 80th Cong. 262 (1948) [hereinafter Hearing
on Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation] (statement of Ralph W. Evans, Shiprock, N.M.).
157. Id.
158. WATERS, supra note 129, at 151. For an example of these photo spreads, see Rogers,
supra note 94, at 36-42. See also Kenneth W. Bilby, Navahos Chained to Reservation By Economic
and Social Fetters: Indians'Freedom a Myth, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Jan. 6, 1948, at 16.
159. Office Report of Amelia Lindley, Assistant Sec'y, Indian Rights Ass'n (Dec. 31, 1947)
(National Museum of the American Indian, NCAI Files, Box 113) (describing a "caravan of trucks"
with seventy tons of supplies from the western states).
160. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal
Legal Systems, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1047, 1112 (2005).
161. See WILKINS, supra note 146, at 162-63.
162. See PARMAN, supra note 139, at 45-46, 53-54.
163. See Stephen Conn, Mid-Passage-The Navajo Tribe and its First Legal Revolution, 6
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 329, 333 (1978).
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the tribe.'" In the courts as well, federal Indian agents were often present,
reading the federal Code of Indian Offenses to illiterate Navajo judges.'
Tribal courts and police were also ineffective in many cases. They were
desperately underfunded--Congress rebuffed repeated Navajo pleas for
funds to give a living wage to tribal judges and hire sufficient tribal police
for their vast reservation.'6 The Navajo Tribal Council had begun putting
their own funds into law enforcement in the 1930s, but couldn't satisfy the
demands for more police protection. Even worse, the tribe had been told that
tribal police could not operate in the checkerboard area to the east of the
reservation, which was almost wholly occupied by tribal members but was
outside official reservation boundaries. State governments had also re-
fused to fund police for that area, which left its communities without any
169
police enforcement at all.
The Navajo people also faced significant obstacles in achieving individ-
ual social and legal equality. Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, the three
states that the Navajo reservation straddled, were the last states to extend the
vote to Indians residing on reservations.o Although all Indians had been
declared federal, and therefore also state, citizens in 1924,", each state used
the special legal status of Indians to insist that they were not constitutionally
entitled to vote. In 1948, in response to a suit by Mohave-Apache veterans,
the Arizona Supreme Court finally overturned a previous decision that Indi-
ans, as "wards of the federal government," were "persons under
164. See Remarks of Allan G. Harper, supra note 140, at 2.
165. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 49 (June 9, 1949) (statement of Norman Littell).
166. See Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Law and Order-Salaries of Judges and
Policemen (July 1945), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-1951, supra note 131, at
207 (noting that salaries for Navajo police officers were "so low that a white man, if he were to
receive such pay, would actually starve on it in less than three months" and urging the commissioner
to approve a higher pay rate); Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Law and Order Personnel-
Policemen, Salaries of (Feb. 21, 1947), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONs, 1922-1951,
supra note 131, at 215 (noting that Congress had not approved the requested salary increase, and
urging the commissioner to make a special effort to obtain it).
167. See Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Law and Order--Court Funds Authorized
for Station Wagon (July 19, 1937), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-1951, supra
note 131, at 199.
168. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 13 (June 8, 1949); see also Navajo Tribal
Council, Resolution on Law and Order-Extend jurisdiction of Tribal Court (Dec. 18, 1945) [here-
inafter Tribal Court Jurisdiction), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONs, 1922-1951, supra
note 131, at 210 (expanding jurisdiction of Court of Indian Offenses in response to federal regula-
tion prohibiting exercise of that jurisdiction over land outside reservation boundaries).
169. See Tribal Court Jurisdiction, supra note 168 ("[T]here is a serious law and order
problem amongst these Indians because of the lack of authority of the State and Federal govern-
ments to act.").
170. See Wolfley, supra note 44, at 184-90 (1991) (discussing history of fights against
disenfranchisement).
171. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)
(2006)).
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guardianship" and thus ineligible to vote.172 That same year, a federal judge
declared invalid a New Mexico law providing that "Indians not taxed" were
ineligible to vote, 73 but the state legislature immediately passed a bill to
reinstate the restriction. The governor vetoed the bill, but the legislature
planned to try again in its next session.174 And as late as 1956, the Utah Su-
preme Court held that native people residing on reservations could not vote
because they were not "residents" of the state; the Utah legislature only
repealed the restriction in 1957 after the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case.
Navajos experienced discrimination in other ways. Arizona and New
Mexico vigorously fought federal demands that they provide reservation
Indians with support for the blind and disabled and for dependent children
under the Social Security Act.'77 Border towns like Gallup, New Mexico
were sites of some of the worst racial hostility against Indians, places where
Navajos faced exclusion from hotels and eating establishments.1' Faced
with extreme deprivation on their reservations and struggling to secure dig-
nity in off-reservation settings, it is not surprising that when presented with
the Fernandez Amendment, some Navajos were initially willing to agree to
state jurisdiction in exchange for greater incorporation.
Tribal attorney Norman Littell played an ambiguous role in this debate
and the Navajo nation building that followed. Littell was an unlikely advo-
cate of tribal sovereignty. As the assistant attorney general in charge of the
Public Lands Division in the 1930s and early 1940s, Littell had primary re-
sponsibility for fighting Indian land claims against the United States.7 In
this role, he had terminated Justice Department support for Felix Cohen in
writing the Handbook of Federal Indian Law when it became clear that the
resulting treatise would be a valuable tool for tribes in litigating those land
claims.8 After the 1946 passage of the Indian Claims Commission Act,
however, Littell (whom Roosevelt had fired in 1944) 18 used his public lands
172. Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948) (overturning Porter v. Hall, 271 P 411
(Ariz. 1928)).
173. See Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 390 (N.M. 1962) (describing unpublished 1948
order and 1953 repeal of voting restriction).
174. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 38 (June 9, 1949).
175. Allen v. Merrell, 305 P.2d 490 (Utah 1956).
176. See Rothfels v. Southworth, 356 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1960) (discussing history of
repeal).
177. See Arizona v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (discussing the litigation); Na-
vajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 59-60 (Oct. 13, 1949) (noting Arizona and New Mexico's refusal
to provide Social Security benefits).
178. See To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 78-79 (1947).
179. See CHRISTIAN W. MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW: THE HUALAPAI LAND CASE
AND THE BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY 152-53 (2007) (discussing Littell's representation of the United
States against Indian tribes).
180. See id.
181. See Judiciary: This Is Inexcusable, TIME, Dec. 11, 1944, at 25.
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litigation experience to successfully market himself as a claims attorney to
the Navajo Nation.182
Despite his dubious background for the task, Littell's vanity appears to
have made him to throw himself into the job. He frequently made speeches
to the Navajo council about the excellence of his work,"' and was eager to
pick fights on behalf of the tribe.'8 He wrote a memoir of his first decade
with the Navajo, speaking with passion and fury of the paternalism of his
old enemies at the BIA.'s' Although Littell enthusiastically praised the lead-
ership ability and wisdom of the Navajos, he was no believer in distinctively
Indian forms of government, mocking Collier's suggestion that non-Indians
might learn something from the Pueblos, 11 and repeatedly insisting that
tribal court judges be younger men with western education.8 Indeed, coun-
cil members' rejection of Littell's advice reveals increasing confidence in
Navajo ways of doing things. Still, as the first attorney working on behalf of
the Navajo tribe, he played an important and often helpful role on the path
to Williams v. Lee.188
When in 1952 Hugh Lee brought his case against Paul and Lorena Wil-
liams, the Navajo people were in a time of turmoil and change. Although the
vast majority of Navajos had little direct contact with non-Navajos or life off
the reservation, the outside world increasingly impacted their lives. Stock
reduction, overgrazing, and drought had undermined their economic inde-
pendence. Returned veterans and boarding school students brought new
ideas to the reservation, challenging traditional ways of life. Formal tribal
governmental institutions seemed little connected to Navajo concerns. The
182. See Littell Charges Cops In Gallup Operating Racket on Navajos, GALLUP INDEP.,
July 11, 1947, at 1 [hereinafter Littell Charges Cops].
183. See, e.g., Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 146 (Jan. 9, 1953) (telling the council
that his work was to be "measured in the change of relationship between the Government and the
Tribe; in the protection of your property rights; in the ever-increasing dignity of the Navajo" and
was worth two to three times what they paid him).
184. The article announcing that he had been hired, for example, also noted that he was
already bringing claims against the Gallup police department. Littell Charges Cops, supra note 182,
at 1.
185. See Norman M. Littell, Reflections of a Tribal Attorney (1957) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file at Beinecke Library).
186. Id. at 13-14.
187. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 248-49 (Oct. 14, 1958) (discussing proposal
by the tribal attorney office to lower age of judges to 21); id. at 20-21 (Jan. 9, 1959) (discussing
proposal to lower age of judges to 30 after council had voted to set minimum age at 35).
188. The end of Littell's career with the Navajos continued its ambiguous tone. The tribe
fired him in 1963 after Raymond Nakai was elected on a platform of "Littell-Must-Go." Nakai cata-
lyzed an Interior Department investigation showing that Littell had, in violation of his contract,
inappropriately obtained an increase in his retainer within five years of the last contract, and had
used the Navajo Nation's general counsel attorneys to assist him with his contingency fee work on
the Navajo claims litigation. Predictably (Littell was fond of suing those who had bruised his ego),
he brought a series of lawsuits unsuccessfully challenging his termination. See Udall v. Littell, 366
F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that interior secretary had authority to fire Littell for cause);
Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965) (dismissing suit against Chairman Nakai for lack of
federal question jurisdiction).
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Navajo people were poised for a debate about whether the continued inde-
pendence of those institutions had anything to offer.
B. 1949 Debates About State Jurisdiction
In June 1949, the Fernandez Amendment presented the tribal council
with the opportunity to debate the future of tribal institutions. The council
was deeply conflicted over the extension of state jurisdiction and the 37-20
vote in favor of the amendment sharply diverged from the consensus de-
manded in the traditional Navajo political process. Four months later the
decision would be overturned in an equally conflicted vote. But the debate
reflects a moment in which many council members expressed doubt about
the viability of tribal institutions and felt that equality demanded state juris-
diction. Although debates about tribal institutions would continue
throughout this period (and indeed, continue today), within a few years the
council had united against state jurisdiction.
Representative Antonio Fernandez's proposal to extend state jurisdiction
over the Navajo and Hopi Reservations came at the end of a year of discus-
sions of the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act. On May 16, 1949, the New
Mexico congressman appeared at a hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Public Lands to propose the measure.'89 Fernandez was concerned about
the deficiencies of tribal law enforcement, as well as the informality of Na-
vajo marriage and divorce.'90 He was particularly committed to the
amendment, however, as a means to make the Navajos "good individual
American citizens, just like anybody else."' 9 ' "You cannot have a good
American citizen of the United States," he declared, "unless you have a
good citizen of the state."'92 Theodore Haas, chief counsel to the Indian Ser-
vice, and one of the last important holdovers from the New Deal
administration, objected that such a measure should not be imposed without
tribal consent, and that the Navajos currently had Navajo judges who spoke
the language and understood Navajo customs.'93 Congresswoman Bosone
was worried that the amendment would only confuse the bill, while Con-
gressman Morris argued that the law might create a perception that the
federal government was giving the tribes money only to come and take them
over. 194 But most of the representatives thanked him for his work for the Na-
189. Navajo and Hopi Rehabilitation: Hearings on H.R. 3476 Before a H. Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Pub. Lands, 81st Cong. 202-04 (1949) (statement of Antonio M.
Fernandez, H. Rep. from New Mexico).
190. Id. at 203.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 251-54 (statement of Theodore H. Hass, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs).
194. Id. at 253.
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vajos, and indeed the committee chairman had proposed a measure to allow
states to assume criminal jurisdiction on all reservations the previous year.
Although the amendment did not require tribal consent, on June 8, 1949,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Nichols came to the Navajo Tribal
Council to discuss the proposal. 96 (The BIA apparently made no effort to
consult with the Hopi village leadership, which later strongly objected to the
measure.)19 Norman Littell arrived the next day to urge the tribe to approve
the amendment.' Littell had discussed the proposal with Fernandez before-
hand, and agreed that it was a necessary step to citizenship.'" He was also
dismissive of the condition of the Navajo courts, declaring that there was
"no place where the chasm between the white man's world and your world
is more evident."200 The council earnestly questioned him about the amend-
ment, and some delegates were likely influenced primarily by his support.
But council members had their own reasons to support state jurisdiction, and
some expressed support on the first day of the debates, before Littell had
even arrived from Washington.
Three factors seemed of primary importance to the supporters. First,
some hoped that law enforcement would improve as a result. The tribe was
deeply concerned about increases in drinking and resulting crime on the
reservation;201 although it had begun devoting its own funds to hiring police
officers, they were understaffed, underpaid, and undertrained. Councilman
Frank Bradley, moreover, recalled past abuses by the Navajo police, saying,
"I know we are getting a better deal from the outside law."202 Residents of
the checkerboard area on the eastern edge of the reservation were particu-
larly supportive of state jurisdiction. Since the BIA had declared that tribal
police had no jurisdiction in the area, there had been no law enforcement
there at all; the residents hoped that state police would fill the void.2 03 This
was not necessarily based on a belief that state law enforcement would be
better. Billy Becenti stated that despite criticisms of the reservation police
and judges, his community "missed them greatly" and felt that they had
taken "good care of us." 204 Still, he said, if the measure persuaded the state
195. Id. at 204, 206, 252.
196. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 2-5 (June 8, 1949).
197. See PHILP, supra note 66, at 62-63.
198. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 38-40 (June 9, 1949).
199. Id. at 38-39.
200. Id. at 50.
201. See Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Law and Order Personnel-Creation of
Navajo Police Force (March 13, 1934), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-1951,
supra note 131, at 197 (petitioning commissioner of Indian Affairs to create a police force to address
new problems of drinking, gambling, and prostitution appearing with wage work on reservation).
202. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 18 (June 8, 1949).
203. See id. at 13-14.
204. Id. at 55 (statement of Billy Becenti).
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police to exercise jurisdiction, it would be an improvement over the "chaotic
condition now."205
Second, council members were afraid of the consequences if they did
not approve jurisdiction. The amendment was, after all, part of a bill to pro-
vide almost $90 million in much needed funds for tribal welfare, education,
health, and infrastructure. The potential loss of money, however, was not the
most significant consideration. Attorney Littell warned that if the Navajos
did not accept state jurisdiction now, Congress might do worse in the fu-
ture.206 The Fernandez Amendment provided for concurrent tribal and
federal jurisdiction and stated that property not otherwise taxed would not
be subject to taxation; Littell reported that Congress had already considered
a state jurisdiction bill without these exceptions in 1948, although the bill
had died in committee. 207 He told the council that they could protect the Na-
vajo Nation from future bills of this kind by agreeing to the Fernandez
Amendment. 208 Even more important was the Navajos' fear of losing their
recently won right to vote. Fernandez himself, in his letter to the Navajos,
reminded the tribe that the New Mexico legislature had passed a bill to re-
scind that right to vote, and that the bill had only escaped enactment because
the governor had vetoed it after the session had ended.209 Fernandez told
them that a similar bill could still pass unless the tribe was placed under
state laws.210 Although Littell should have recognized that any such restric-
211
tions on the vote were illegal, he repeated this argument to the council.
The most significant argument of the proponents, however, was that
state jurisdiction would mean equality. Fernandez and Littell both presented
the amendment in this way, as necessary for the Navajos to "assume the full
duties and responsibilities of citizenship."2 12 Lilly Neil, the first woman to
serve on the Navajo council, made an impassioned speech in support of this
notion:
Mr. Chairman, friends, my people and all, citizenship is one of the nicest
things there is in the world. You can feel free to say what you want and go
where you want... . We must go forward instead of saying here, "I have
no confidence in myself. I am going to stand here and say to the govern-
205. Id. As the counties' objection to policing those areas was not legal but financial, this
hope was not well founded. Indeed, recent studies of law enforcement in Public Law 280 states, in
which state criminal jurisdiction on reservations is clear, show that unwillingness to expend funds
policing reservations actually contributes to lawlessness in those areas. See Carole Goldberg-
Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1405 (1997).
206. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 49 (June 9, 1949).
207. See id. at 47.
208. See id. at 48. Littell assured the council that the amendment prohibited any taxation;
this was poor legal advice as the amendment only explicitly prohibited property taxes, and then only
"until otherwise provided by Congress." Id. at 52.
209. Id. at 39 (June 8, 1949).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 55 (Oct. 13, 1949).
212. Id. at 39 (June 9, 1949).
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ment to come and help me." . . .We are in bondage, isn't it? We are tied up
as it is. Now the citizens come out and say to us "Come out and do like we
do." . . .We have a chance, I think we should take it.2 13
As a resident of the checkerboard area denied both tribal and state law en-
forcement, she was dubious that the Navajos were already "full citizens."2 14
Another council member spoke about scientific studies proving that Navajos
were just as intelligent as whites and about the long denials of the right to
vote. Sam Ahkeah, the chairman of the tribe, said that he believed "this
amendment will just make us a little taller individuals instead of being just
children as we are now."215
Opponents of the amendment had equality-based arguments of their
own. Emphasizing concerns about discrimination, Howard Gorman worried
216
about the brutality Navajos had experienced from state police. Invoking
the right to equal political power, Maxwell Yazzie argued that the amend-
ment appeared to be the state's attempt to "give us a small portion of the
citizen's right whereby they will have the upper hand over us," and sug-
gested they already had the citizen's right with the right to vote2
Suggesting the ways in which poverty would impair equal access to justice,
Vice-chairman Zhealy Tso pointed out the expenses of litigation in state
court, and the fact that Navajos would have no money to appeal unfair deci-
sions.218 But even these opponents had little language to express support for
independent Navajo institutions except the fear that illiterate tribal members
were not prepared for state jurisdiction. Proponents reacted angrily to these
suggestions, speaking with pride of their young veterans and their ability to
compete in the white world.2'9 The council voted to support the amendment
37 to 20.220
On July 28, 1949, however, the council's advisory committee declared
that "after attending Navajo meetings in the past month, [we] believe that it
is the con[s]ensus of opinion of the Navajo people" that the tribe should
reject state jurisdiction.221 They unanimously resolved that the Fernandez
Amendment should be stripped from the rehabilitation bill at the next coun-
222 223
cil meeting. Chairman Ahkeah began to publicly oppose the measure.
213. Id. at 56-57.
214. Id. at 57.
215. Id. at 54.
216. Id. at 18-19 (June 8, 1949).
217. Id. at 50 (June 9, 1949).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 56-57 (June 10, 1949).
220. Id. at 65 (June 10, 1949).
221. Advisory Committee of the Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Fernandez Amendment
(July 28, 1949), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-195 1, supra note 131, at 130.
222. Id.
223. See Indians Oppose Control: They Also Object to $88,000,000 Social Security Pro-
gram, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1949, at 24.
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But before the next scheduled council meeting could take place, Con-
gress approved the bill. The ACLU lobbied President Truman for a veto,
arguing that the Navajos and Hopis "are full-fledged voting citizens and
deserve better at the hands of their government." 224 Opponents also con-
demned Fernandez's other amendment, which would relieve the states of
most responsibility for Social Security payments to reservation Indians.2 '
Newspaper editorials also joined the call. In particular, Eleanor Roosevelt
used her "My Day" column in the Washington Daily Times to invoke racial
justice and the Cold War in attacking both the Fernandez Amendment and
the emerging trends in federal Indian policy:
One of the Soviet attacks on the democracies, particularly the United
States, centers on our racial policies. In recent months the Russians have
been particularly watching our attitude toward the native Indians of our
country. So, the question of what we do about our Indians, important as it
used to be for the sake of justice, is enhanced in importance now because it
is part of the fight which we and other democracies must wage, day in and
day out, in perfecting our governmental households so that it will not be
vulnerable to attack by the Communists.22
Such editorials catalyzed writers from across the country to write to Truman
sounding similar themes, maintaining that "improvement of our treatment of
racial minorities is crucial in [the] struggle with Cominform" and declaring
the amendment a "Jim Crow" rider that "affects our international good-
will."227 NCAI Secretary Ruth Muskrat Bronson (who diverged from NCAI
President Johnson on the question of state jurisdiction) had coordinated
these lobbying efforts, but was reluctant to take a public stand without for-
mal rejection by the Navajo government.22
On October 11, Ahkeah called an emergency council meeting to discuss
the veto.29 Littell urged the council to reiterate its approval of state jurisdic-
tion, but this time the council was less sure. Many of the strongest advocates
for the measure maintained their positions. But now Ahkeah, who had tenta-
tively supported the measure, objected that Congress was imposing state
jurisdiction, which the tribe had not asked for, instead of the funds for edu-
230
cation that they had requested. It seemed to him that Congress was saying
they would "pay for the show with the $90,000,000 and invite the State as
the audience and say dance the strip tease here.. . . I think there is a finer
224. Letter from Jay B. Nash, Chairman, Indian Civil Rights Committee, ACLU, to Phileo
Nash, White House (Oct. 5, 1949).
225. See Indians Oppose Contro, supra note 223 (discussing opposition to extension of
state control).
226. Roosevelt, supra note 64.
227. ROSIER, supra note 63, at 136-37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Telegram from Ruth Bronson to Sam Ahkeah, Chairman, Navajo Tribal Council (Oct.
5, 1949) (NCAI Archives, National Museum of the American Indian).
229. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 13 (Oct. 11, 1949).
230. See id. at 18 (Oct. 12, 1949).
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way of helping my people, there is a finer way to do that." 231 Vice-chairman
Tso called the amendments a "cloudy mess that has formed around that bill
which we nursed along."232 Invoking the ability of the Navajos to decide
what was best for themselves, he declared that "[iln following their own
mind, the dictates of their thoughts," the Navajos had become a big tribe, but
now Fernandez had decided to "introduc[e] state control over the Indians.""'
Littell again insisted on the deficiencies of the tribal courts, saying that
Fernandez had threatened that Congress wouldn't appropriate sufficient
money for them until they were part of the state system.23 But now William
Truswell, attorney for the Navajo Agency of the Office of Indian Affairs,
told the council, "It may be that the Indian courts are not too good, but let
me tell you from experience that the [state justice of the peace] courts are
worse."235 He also corrected Littell's insistence that the measure exempted
236additional property from taxation. Howard Gorman told them that at
NCAI meetings North Dakota Indians had told him of the discrimination
237that they experienced there. Insisting on Navajo equality, he declared,
I would like for the white people to become assimilated to the Navajos in-
stead of the Navajos becoming assimilated to the whites if that is the way it
is going to be. We are just as proud as the white people. I think we are just
231as human as anyone else.
Perhaps most damning to the bill, Councilman Dan Keanie linked it to the
unpopular grazing regulations, declaring to applause that they had been told
they could change those if they didn't like them as well, and he would only
approve the Fernandez Amendment if the grazing regulations were finally
repealed.239 The vote this time was even narrower, but now the opponents of
state jurisdiction prevailed: 19 in favor to 26 against.240
On October 17, Truman vetoed the law. The veto message was a peculiar
mix of paternalistic and equality-based arguments. He described state juris-
diction over Indians as the ultimate consequence of full participation in
American society, but a step for which the Navajos were not yet "prepared"
because of their lack of education and the "primitive background of their
social concepts."241 But he also endorsed the idea that respect for Indian
231. Id.
232. Id. at 41 (Oct. 13, 1949).
233. Id. at 40, 42.
234. Id. at 49.
235. Id. at 51.
236. See id. at 48.
237. Id. at 59.
238. Id. at 59-60.
239. Id. at 45.
240. Id. at 62.
241. HARRY S. TRUMAN, REHABILITATION OF THE NAVAJO AND Hori TRIBES OF INDIANS-
VETO MESSAGE, S. Doc. No. 81-119, at 1-3 (1949).
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people required respect for their choices, and that without Navajo approval,
the measure would violate the "fundamental ... principle of respect for tri-
bal self-determination in matters of local government."2 42 Despite the
seeming consensus on state jurisdiction as an ultimate step for the Navajo
people, however, the tribe would move decisively away from that goal over
the following years.
C. Nation Building in Navajoland
In the years that followed the debate over the Fernandez Amendment,
the tribal council did not even consider state jurisdiction; instead, it sought
to build strong and independent tribal institutions. This was facilitated by
changed economic circumstances. Postwar development of oil, coal, and
uranium on the reservation provided the tribal government with discretion-
ary resources for the first time in its history. But the impulse toward
institution building seems to have come primarily from the tribal council
and the demands of the Navajo people. Increasingly, both the Navajo gov-
ernment and its constituents insisted that Navajo ways and Navajo
institutions should govern Navajo lives, and that efforts to undermine those
institutions were tantamount to denigration of Navajos themselves.
Navajo participation and interest in tribal government increased signifi-
cantly in the 1950s..This was in part because of election reforms enacted in
1950, under which candidates would be selected in the various election dis-
tricts, rather than by voice vote at the agency office in Window Rock.243 The
1951 election saw an 82 percent increase in the number of voters over the
previous election in 1946; an unheard-of 87 percent of those eligible to vote
participated. 244
There was also a changed attitude toward the tribal council, which had
previously been accurately seen as simply a "go-between [for] themselves
and Washington," and, perhaps equally accurately, as really an agent of the
241federal government. In 1952, Superintendent Alan Harper moved the su-
perintendent's seat "from the Chairman's right elbow" to a position off of
the platform at council meetings, to symbolize that the "Indian Bureau must
recede from its position of dictatorial monopoly."246 Most important from the
perspective of the people, now that Navajo representatives had funds to dis-
perse and real authority over grazing and other regulations, Navajos turned
to them to get what they wanted. In response to growing public interest,
Councilman Howard Gorman broadcast a daily radio program on council
242. Id. at 2.
243. News Release, Allan G. Harper, Area Director, Window Rock Area Office, The Navajo
Tribal Election 2 (Jan. 3, 1951).
244. See Results of Navajo Voting at Election on March 5th and 6th, 1951, Window Rock
Area Office (on file with the National Museum of the American Indian in the NCAI Archives).
245. Blake Brophy, Shonto: Life in a Navajo Community, Aiuz. DAYS & WAYS MAG., Sept.
27, 1959, at 38, 42.
246. Remarks of Allan G. Harper, supra note 140, at 2.
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proceedings while the council was in session.247 In an indirect sign of Navajo
popular support, in 1957, the 12,000 Navajos living on the New Mexico
portion of the reservation united to form a voting bloc to oppose termina-
tion, many of them registering and voting for the first time since obtaining
the vote in 1948.248 Although there was still much suspicion of the central-
ized government, it had begun to be more a government of the people than
of the BIA.
The decade also saw significant development of the Navajo legal sys-
tem. Beginning in 1934, the Navajo Tribal Council had petitioned for more
federal funds for tribal law enforcement to handle the disruption caused by
the transition to work for wages and off-reservation employment.249 In
creased contact with the outside world and increased participation in a wage
economy had brought both more alcohol and more disorder to the reserva-
tion.250 The need for additional funds only became more pressing as veterans
returned from World War II struggling with the psychological impacts of
war and less responsive to traditional clan-based systems of social control.
When the federal government did not respond to these requests, the tribe
sought to fill the gap. Tribal funding for law enforcement went from $8,000
12per year in 1952 to $786,000 in 1959. The resulting system was far from
perfect; indeed, the younger veterans initially appointed to the police force
were soon seen as too rough, and communities sought to bring back "our
uneducated old policemen," who handled the Navajos "the way they should
be handled, the way [they] like to be handled."253 But it was increasingly a
Navajo system, however flawed.
Even police hired with Navajo funds, however, were federal employees
under federal control. In a hearing on police services, Chief of Police Lo-
renzo Shirley said that their actions were limited by the federal Code of
Indian Offenses: "We do not want to go over this book. We want to stay
within this book, so it is pretty hard. I understand my own people. I am a
247. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 136 (Jan. 8, 1953) (describing response to
program); see also PARMAN, supra note 139, at 116 (describing effect of weekly radio broadcasts in
1938 in bringing Navajos closer to the tribal government).
248. Navajos Distrust Control By State: 12,000 in New Mexico United Against Bills for
Ending Federal Jurisdiction, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1957, at 51.
249. See Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Law and Order-Creation of Navajo Police
Force (Mar. 13, 1934), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONs, 1922-1951, supra note 131, at
197.
250. See id.
251. Conn, supra note 163, at 339.
252. 8 NAVAJo AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, NAVAJO YEARBOOK REPORT 281
(Robert W. Young ed., 1961) [hereinafter NAVAJO YEARBOOK]. In the same period, federal funding
increased only modestly, from $57,000 to $89,000. Id.
253. Paul Jones, Chairman, Inaugural Speech to the Navajo Tribal Council 7 (Apr. 4, 1955)
(transcript available in the National Museum of the American Indian in the NCAI Archives). Some
communities were not interested in police at all, preferring "to settle transgressions by family retri-
bution." Brophy, supra note 245, at 38, 42. But the demands in tribal council minutes for increased
policing are so numerous that they suggest that the desire for tribal police was dominant. See, e.g.,
Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, passim.
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Navajo myself."25 4 When asked at a later hearing who he worked for, he an-
swered, "[Clivil service. I am strictly a Government man I guess."255 In
1959, the tribe addressed this by formally acquiring control of the police
from the BIA. 256
In 1959, the tribe also assumed formal control of the court system,
which had gone through a similar process over the same decade.25 Most
disputes were still settled in communities by clans and families,258 but to
secure veteran's, pension, and social security benefits, family members
needed formal proof of marriage.259 Police, moreover, needed courts to proc-
ess arrestees. Again, conflict arose over whether judges should be younger,
literate men or older ones who were uneducated but were more familiar with
community ways. In 1951, the tribe returned to a system of elected judges to
give community members more control, but qualifications were still an is-
sue. Although Littell insisted that judges needed to be educated, community
members objected, asking whether they had "accepted only what the white
people have accepted ... the white man's way that is constantly put in our
faces?" 260 In 1958, the council resisted efforts by their non-Navajo attorneys
to lower the age of judges from 35 to 21 in order to attract more educated,
English-speaking judges to the position.21 When their non-Indian attorneys
revived this debate in 1959, Billy Becenti, who had supported the Fernandez
Amendment ten years earlier, protested:
Are we going to change the language of the Navajos altogether? . . . We
would like to still use the Navajo way of thinking, the Navajo manner of
doing things, and use the Navajo customs at this time yet. The idea that we
are going to have to change all Navajo thinking, I don't believe stands well
for the Tribe.262
In the debate over the Fernandez Amendment, a council member had spoken
with concern about a Navajo judge who wore a traditional headband;"' now
the council was opposing its attorneys' attempts to make the courts less Na-
vajo. Although the debate over whether Navajo judicial institutions should
be more Anglo or more Navajo remained far from resolved, its resolution
had become a matter of Navajo choice.
254. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 87 (Jan. 7, 1953).
255. Id. at 538.
256. Id. at 15-16, 23 (Jan. 6, 1959).
257. Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175,
177 n.17 (1994).
258. See supra note 250 (discussing familiar disorder on the reservation).
259. Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Marriage-Conditions Regarding (Nov. 5,
1947), in NAVAJO TRIBAL COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1922-1951, supra note 131, at 89.
260. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 96 (statement of Anna Wauneka, Councilwoman,
relating general community sentiment).
261. Id. at 249-51, 253-62 (Oct. 14-15, 1958).
262. Id. at 628-29 (June 10, 1959).
263. Id. at 43 (June 9, 1949).
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The most revealing debate of the period concerned the adoption of a Na-
vajo Constitution in 1953. Littell had drafted the document himself and
presented it with great pride. 264 The preamble revealed Littell's limited vi-
sion of the role of tribal government, declaring that the Navajos adopted the
constitution for distinctly federal reasons:
[I]n order to exercise more fully our privileges and duties as American citi-
zens and promote the general welfare of our people, to cooperate more
fully with the government of the United States in developing the resources
of the Navajo Reservation for our benefit, and to establish a self-
265
supporting economy offering education and opportunity for all ....
His proposed method of adoption was also telling: he wanted the document
adopted by a simple two-thirds vote of the tribal council, rather than the
popular election that federal law required for adoption of a Bureau of Indian
266Affairs constitution. The substantive discussion in the tribal council re-
jected this idea of governmental fiat and focused less on the language of the
document itself than on what adoption of a constitution would mean.
The debate began with both fear and excitement at the idea of any con-
stitution. The Navajos had resisted federal pressure to adopt a constitution in
1937 and still recalled it as a part of the federal domination that led to stock
reduction; some council members had to be reassured that the constitution
261
would not facilitate federal control. Others called the constitution a
"sacred document" and saw it as part of the broader progress toward self-
government.268 But all were concerned that both the council and the Navajo269
people needed to understand the broader implications of the constitution.
This concern increased when, after Councilman Gorman broadcast a report
of the proposed constitution, constituents began expressing confusion and
fear about what the council was doing.
The council decided that much more community debate was needed be-
fore they could adopt a constitution. As one member stated, "[I]t is not now
a sacred document," and, "[I]t will become sacred only when it is genuinely
understood and supported by the whole Navajo Tribe. It will never become
sacred if it contains only the thinking of a small group of people."271' Kee
McCabe, one of the oldest council members, took this opportunity to ad-
dress the council for the first time in the two years since he had been
264. See id. at 131 (Jan. 8, 1953); id at 146 (Jan. 9, 1953).
265. Id. at 116 (Jan. 8, 1953).
266. Hearing on Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation, supra note 156, at 386 (statement of Norman
M. Littell, General Counsel for the Navajos).
267. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 130-31 (Jan. 8, 1953); id. at 136 (Jan. 9,
1953).
268. Id. at 170 (Jan. 9, 1953),
269. Id. at 168-73.
270. Id. at 136.
271. Id. at 188 (Jan. 12, 1953).
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elected.272 He drew an analogy to the sacred Navajo ceremonies, saying that
they had long operated under an unwritten constitution of their own,
directing the proper order and manner of performance. 273 He then encour-
aged the council to recognize their own ability to govern:
[Y]ou, as leaders among us to have ceremonials, have all of these things in
your head, but you hesitate to bring them out-the planning or origin of
planning for your people. Then, in the Navajo ceremonials, there is a place
where these things take place.. . .That is the plan here.27
Littell had told the council that the constitution had been handed down to
275them through history through the suffering of Anglo-Americans. In dis-
cussing it, however, council members began asserting their own history and
governance traditions.
In other ways, the council began insisting on Navajo solutions to Navajo
problems during the decade. They questioned the wisdom of the relocation
policy that sent Navajos off reservation for menial jobs,2 76 and secured the
right to revise the grazing regulations on the reservation. 2n From federal
domination to debate over integration and equality, the tribe had increas-
ingly moved towards self-determination.
IV. WILuAMS v LEE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST STATE JURISDICTION
Many Navajo institution building moves were designed to evade state ju-
risdiction. Although the council had once approved the Fernandez
Amendment, now tribal council members invoked the amendment as a dan-
ger narrowly avoided. When Congress passed Public Law 280, Ahkeah
urged President Eisenhower to veto the law, condemning it as "oppressive
and unjust." 78 Although in 1949 council members had argued that citizen-
ship required accepting state jurisdiction, now Councilwoman Annie
Wauneka invoked citizenship as a tool to revoke Public Law 280, reminding
the council that "we are citizens of these United States and every citizen
enjoys the privilege of voting for Congress."279 Williams v. Lee was part of
this broader campaign to ward off state jurisdiction and insist that Navajos
had the ability and the right to control reservation affairs.
272. Id. at 193.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 194.
275. Id. at 133 (Jan. 8, 1953).
276. Id. at 14, 29-30 (Nov. 2, 1953); id. at 58-66 (Nov. 4, 1953).
277. Id. at 196 (Jan. 12, 1953).
278. New Pleas Are Filed for Indian Bill Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1953, at 18 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
279. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 19 (Feb. 8, 1954).
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A. The Dispute Emerges: Traders, Sheep Herds,
and a Navajo Family
Williams involved two institutions at the heart of Navajo popular con-
cern about tribal sovereignty: federal Indian traders and sheep herds. On the
vast Navajo reservation, federally licensed traders were virtually the Nava-
jos' sole connection with the outside world. Under federal laws first enacted
in 1790, all those who wanted to trade with the Indians had to obtain federal
licenses to do so.2 80 With the exception of federal employees and missionar-
ies, traders were essentially the only non-Indians living in Navajo country,
and their reach extended much deeper, since they and their families moved
281
into areas far from the few paved roads and population centers.
Navajo people were highly dependent on the traders. The traders were
both the Navajos' only source of flour, vegetables, and manufactured goods
and the only accessible market for Navajo products like wool, rugs, and je-
282welry. In addition, in largely illiterate communities without mailing
addresses, they were vital intermediaries, writing and reading letters com-
municating with government agencies and faraway relatives, and receiving
and cashing checks from railroad employers and pension boards.283 The trad-
ing post was so central to Navajo life that when the tribe organized its
central government, the seventy-two constituencies electing representatives
214
to the tribal council were based on the trade areas they had established.
Although traders performed a necessary service and were justifiably
proud of their contributions to Navajo life, their monopoly power also led to
abuse. A number of traders only paid for goods or cashed checks with tin
money stamped with the traders' mark that could be exchanged only at that
trading post.285 Others put only letters, not prices, on their goods, so that
286
only the trader would know the price. The hard economic times, moreover,
squeezed traders and their customers, and placed significant strain on the
barter and credit system under which most did business. In 1948, the Navajo
Council took one of its first independent steps by enacting elaborate regula-
tions replacing the old system of leases of trading posts with a share of gross
sales profits and by limiting the mark-ups that traders could impose on
280. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137, 137 (current version codified at 25
U.S.C. § 261 (2006)).
281. ALBERT HUGH LEE ET AL., GAAMALIITSOH, INDIAN TRADER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
ALBERT HUGH LEE, 1897-1976, at 60 (1982) [hereinafter GAAMALIITSOH] (describing isolation of
early trading post).
282. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 499 F.2d 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1971) (describing role of trad-
ing post); MORIs S. BURGE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS ON NAVAJO TRADING 7, 11 (1949).
283. See Hearing on Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation, supra note 156, at 266-67 (statement of
Howard Wilson); Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 82-85 (Jan. 7, 1953) (discussing problem with
withholding checks); WATERS, supra note 129, at 94.
284. Brophy, supra note 245, at 38.
285. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 269-72 (Jan. 14, 1953).
286. Id. at 271.
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217goods. The traders bitterly resented these measures and sent a delegation
of the United Indian Traders Association to Congress to successfully prevent
288federal approval of the law.
The effort to collect on debts for goods in state court was also a product
of changing conditions among the Navajo people. In the 1940s and 1950s,
the BIA sought to address poverty on reservations by encouraging Indians to
leave their reservations in search of work elsewhere.28 Although Navajos
and their council representatives initially welcomed these efforts, by the
early 1950s they began to debate the wisdom of sending non-English-
speaking Navajos to cities or farm camps without meaningful training or
assistance.290 The statement of one council member reflected the grim reali-
ties: "We have trouble all the time as to who is responsible for the return of
the dead bodies from these different locations. We get letters all the time
asking as to who is to pay for the return of these bodies." 29 1 The returning
relocatees also introduced the Navajo people to a modem staple of Indian
country: the "Indian car"292 and the repo man that came with it. Young Nava-
jos would come back home with "old, delapidated [sic] cars" that they had
bought on credit; when they didn't keep up their payments, agents of the car
dealers would come on the reservation and repossess them.293 According to
Norman Littell, the traders were "very jealous" of this remedy against de-
294
linquent Navajo buyers and wanted to try it themselves.
Trader Hugh Lee was the first to try it. Like many traders on the Navajo
Nation, Hugh Lee was part of an old trading family.295 His great-great-
grandfather John D. Lee had come to the southwest in the 1840s as an
original follower of Brigham Young and the Mormon Church, and his great-
287. Navajo Tribal Council, Resolution on Traders Regulations, in Navajo Resolutions,
supra note 131, at 496 (March 20, 1948).
288. See Hearing on Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation, supra note 156, at 273-85; BURGE, supra
note 282, at 1-3.
289. 2005 COHEN, supra note 49, at 92-93.
290. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 58-66 (Nov. 4, 1953); id. at 29-30 (Nov. 2,
1953).
291. Id. at 62 (Nov. 4, 1953).
292. Keith Secola's popular song NDN KRZ '49 (Indian Cars) memorialized the kinds of
cars often sold to Indian people:
My car is dented, the radiator steams
One headlight don't work, the radio can scream
I got a sticker says "Indian Power"
I stuck it on my bumper
It's what holds my car together
We're on a circuit of an Indian dream
We don't get old, we just get younger
When we're flying down the highway
Riding in our Indian Car
KEITH SECOLA, NDN KRZ '49, on NATIVE AMERICANA (AKINA Records 2005).
293. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 155 (Jan. 9, 1953).
294. Id. at 155, 158 (Jan. 9, 1953).
295. LEE ET AL., supra note 281, at 20, 41.
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grandfather had established one of the first trading posts in the western part
296of the Navajo Nation. His father took over his first trading post shortly
after Hugh was born, and by the 1930s owned seven trading posts across the
Navajo Nation.297 Hugh spoke Navajo fluently, and Navajo children were his
298only playmates until he was four years old.
Hugh Lee first managed his father's store at Black Mountain, and then
took over Ganado Trading Post from his father in 1945.299 By 1948, he had
been elected president of the United Indian Traders Association.3 00 In April
1948, he led a delegation to Congress to testify against the Navajo plan to
impose rent and price restrictions on the traders. 30' He declared the plan con-
trary to the principle of free enterprise that America was built on, but urged
Congress to do something to help the Navajos, declaring that the traders
were eager to help them become a "solid, sound, well-trained and well-
educated group of citizens.2 Like most traders, Lee appears to have been
deeply convinced that he was acting in the best interests of the Navajos, but
he was also committed to protecting the prerogatives of the trader.
It appears that most of the debt Lee claimed against the Williamses had
accumulated during the hard times of the late 1940s. According to the ac-
counts Lee provided to the court, the couple owed him $533.49 as of
303January 16, 1950. The records show that they made regular payments of
$40 (likely representing the sale of individual sheep) toward the debt after
that date, but because of their continuing purchases the total debt varied lit-
tle.304 The couple made a large payment of sheep and cash totaling $151.50
on August 3, 1952, but when Lee filed for a writ of attachment in October
1952, they still had a debt of $361.22 .
Pursuant to the writ, on October 21, 1952, Sheriff John Crosby of
Apache County, Arizona, drove to the Ganado Trading Post, picked up assis-
tant manager Wendell Harris, and went looking for the Williamses' sheep
306herd. Harris directed Crosby over the dirt roads that led to Paul and Lo-
rena's home in Steamboat. Although Lee's complaint stated that the couple
was served with the writ of attachment and summons, Mrs. Williams and
her daughter, Verdie Mae Lee, recalled that Verdie Mae, eighteen years old
296. Id. at 28, 164-65.
297. Id. at 42, 128.
298. Id. at 148.
299. Id. at 128, 185.
300. Hearing on Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation, supra note 156, at 282.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 284.
303. Transcript of Record at 35, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39) [hereinafter
Transcript of Record].
304. Id. at 35-37.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 14.
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and a new bride, was the only adult at home at the time.30 ' Too frightened to
stop them, she just watched as the sheriff loaded twenty-eight sheep and
four goats into the truck.sos Decades later, Lorena Williams would recall,
"They didn't tell us what they were going to do .... Our sheep were gone
and we didn't know why."30
The sheriff did not hold the sheep he seized but instead brought them
back to the Ganado Trading Post to be held there.1 o On October 23, Paul
and Lorena paid Hugh an additional $280, bringing their total debt down to
$81,'" but he did not release the remaining sheep. They refused to accept
this result.
Paul and Lorena Williams were in many ways a typical Navajo couple.
They lived in Steamboat on the same plot of land surrounded by sandstone
walls where Lorena had grown up and where, following Navajo custom,
Paul joined her when they married.3 12 In their forties when the case began,
they had raised a family of eight on the land."' Their oldest daughter, Verdie
Mae, had recently brought her husband Ralph Lee (no relation to the trader)
314to live in the compound as well. Although one of their daughters was away
at boarding school when the case began, most of the children were still liv-
ing at home."' The family lived off the sheep herd, buying goods on credit
from Ganado Trading Post twenty-five miles away and paying their bills by
selling lambs in the fall and wool in the spring.1 They rarely had cash.
Asked in 2007 whether anyone in the family had a paying job in 1952, Lo-
rena Williams "smiled and answered 'Adin'-nothing."3 17
Fifty years later, Lorena Williams recalled the quality of her sheep with
pride; although the average price per lamb was $40, hers were so fat and
healthy they often sold for $60 or $70 a lamb. 31 8 The sheep were also a part
of the family's life and culture. Following the tradition that children would
be given some lambs to raise as their own, a number of the sheep seized
belonged to their daughters.319 When it became necessary to slaughter the
sheep, Mrs. Williams's elderly mother would come to the compound and put
307. Interview with Verdie Mae Lee, in Steamboat, Navajo Nation (Mar. 23, 2009).
308. See Transcript of Record, supra note 303, at 14-15, 19.
309. Jason Begay, Sovereignty Case Began With Missing Sheep, NAVAJO TIMES, Apr. 19,
2007, at A3, available at 2007 WLNR 9021854 (Westlaw).
310. Transcript of Record, supra note 303, at 14.
311. Id. at 37.
312. Interview with Lorena Williams, in Steamboat, Navajo Nation (Mar. 24, 2009).
313. Id.
314. Interview with Verdie Mae Lee, supra note 307.
315. Interview with Lorena Williams, supra note 312.
316. Begay, supra note 309.
317. Id.
318. Interview with Lorena Williams, supra note 312.
319. Transcript of Record, supra note 303, at 7-8.
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sacred corn pollen on the brow and tongue of a selected sheep to sanctify
320the butchering.
For Mrs. Williams, the seizure of the sheep was incomprehensible, a
theft, a violation of all ethical norms.321 The sheriff had cut through the herd
indiscriminately, taking ewes from their lambs and lambs from their moth-
ers.322 Mrs. Williams cried many times to think of the sheep that she had
cared for corralled in a pen at Ganado, eating hay rather than the natural
vegetation she had raised them on.323 At ninety-eight years of age, she re-
called it as the thing that had hurt her most deeply in her life, a violation
324from which she had never fully recovered.
In seizing the sheep, the state courts had struck at the core of Navajo
concerns about self-government.325 Forcible BIA stock reduction was the
cause of the bitterest Navajo resentment of the federal government.326 As
historian Donald Parman writes, "The entire episode revived old but still
vivid memories of Carson's campaign and the horrors of Bosque Redon-
do,"' where Navajos had been confined away from their homeland, a
confinement that ended only after the Treaty of 1868. "Like these earlier
traumas, the second herd reduction bred a fear and anguish which lasted for
decades."328 By attaching the herd, the state court had aligned itself with out-
side oppression rather than the freedom that Fernandez had promised. The
couple consulted with Howard Gorman, their representative on the council,
and the tribe soon arranged for Holbrook attorney William E. Ferguson to
329
represent them.
Although the tribe paid for the attorney, the family spent much money
and time prosecuting the lawsuit. Their son-in-law Ralph Lee was the only
one in the family with a car; they spent many hours and dollars on gas driv-
330ing to Window Rock, Holbrook, and Saint Johns to pursue the litigation.
They held several expensive ceremonies to secure success in the lawsuit
over the years. Paul Williams's father and brother, both traditional medicine
men, conducted Navajo Beauty Way ceremonies on their behalf; another
medicine man came from Tuba City to conduct one as well.33' Ralph Lee
320. Interview with Bessie Yellowhair-Simpson, in Steamboat, Navajo Nation (Mar. 24,
2009).
321. Interview with Lorena Williams, supra note 312.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See John J. Wood et al., "Sheep is Life": An Assessment of Livestock Reduction in the
Former Navajo-Hopi Joint Use Area 25-26 (N. Ariz. Univ. Anthropological Paper No. 1, 1982).
326. See Parman, supra note 139, at 65-66, 77.
327. Id. at 62.
328. Id.
329. See Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 268-69 (July 20, 1953).
330. Interview with Verdie Mae Lee, supra note 307.
331. Interview with Lorena Williams, supra note 312.
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was a follower of the Native American Church, and church leaders came
332
from Oklahoma to hold prayer meetings for them. All of these ceremonies
required housing, feeding, and support for the holy men and the participants.
The Williams family had to pawn their jewelry and rugs and butcher part of
their remaining sheep herd to pay for these expenses.' Despite the added
hardship, they were determined to do what they had to in order to win.
B. State Court Proceedings
The legal arguments in Williams v. Lee were not shaped by the Navajo
people, but reflect the same tension between integration and self-
determination that was seen in the debates of the Navajo council. Both sides
understood the contest as one between the rights of tribes as independent
political communities and the status of tribal members as citizens of the
states.
On November 7, 1952, Ferguson filed a motion to dismiss in the Apache
County Superior Court in St. Johns.P3 The motion asserted two basic
grounds for dismissal: first, that Navajo Indians were not subject to the gen-
eral jurisdiction of the state courts; and second, that the three-year state
statute of limitations had run since all goods comprising the debt had been
purchased prior to June 10, 1949.335 The motion also asserted a counterclaim
for damages of $1,496: $960 for the value of the stock, $500 for the time
and expense in fighting the claim, and $36 in transportation costs. 36 The
couple also protested that a number of the sheep seized in fact belonged to
two of their daughters,337 as suggested by the fact that many of the sheep
were branded with a "V' or an "R," rather than with a "W" like the William-
331
ses' sheep. Of course, Lee's response rejected these contentions.
The motion to dismiss sat in the superior court for two years, and Lee
quickly got tired of taking care of the sheep. On February 2, 1953, he filed a
petition for permission to sell the sheep, pleading that the expense of feed-
ing them would soon exceed their value.339 Over the Williamses' objections,
the superior court ordered Sheriff Crosby to hold a public auction at the
Ganado Trading Post.34 On March 26, Crosby auctioned off eleven ewes,
two rams, and four goats, returning the remainder of the flock to the cou-
ple.34' Although the $274 netted during the sale more than compensated for
332. Interview with Verdie Mae Lee, supra note 307.
333. Interview with Lorena Williams, supra note 312.
334. Transcript of Record, supra note 303, at 4-5.
335. Id. at 6-7.
336. Id. at 7-8.
337. Id. at 7-8, 9-10.
338. Id. at 9.
339. Id. at 9-10.
340. Id. at 22-24.
341. Id. at 31-33.
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the remaining $81 debt to Lee, the sheriff claimed $247 for the costs of
serving the summons, hiring an interpreter, attaching and transporting the
sheep, advertising the sale, and returning the remaining sheep to the Wil-
liams home.342 In other words, before any adjudication of jurisdiction or the
underlying collection claim, their sheep had been seized and held, many had
been sold, and, if the Williamses lost the dispute, the couple would be even
more deeply in debt than when the case began.
It was not until December 3, 1954 that the superior court finally decided
the motion to dismiss. The court decisively rejected the motion, relying
heavily on the citizenship of the Navajo Indians and the right to vote re-
cently acknowledged by the Arizona Supreme Court:
On the one hand the Court has extended to them all of the rights .. . as cit-
izens of the United States and the State of Arizona. On the other hand the
Supreme Court has upheld their inherent limited powers of self-
government and generally speaking not subject to State law. To my mind
these two conceptions of the status of Indians cannot be harmonized. No
man can serve two masters, nor bear allegiance to two independent nations
or communities. As citizens of Arizona they have the right and do partici-
pate in making the laws and it is axiomatic that those who make the laws
must obey them in a democracy .... It is my opinion that the grant of citi-
zenship by the Government to the Navajo Indians and accepted by the
State of Arizona has emancipated the Navajo Indians in all respects not ex-
pressly excluded by the Congress of the United States.3
The holding that citizenship emancipated the Navajos and undermined their
special legal status was contrary to federal law. After some initial ambiguity,
the United States Supreme Court had repeatedly held that citizenship did not
undermine federal power with respect to Indians,345 and the Arizona Su-
preme Court had recognized this in its 1948 decision that Indians had the
346
right to vote. But the decision conformed to the rhetoric of the termination
policy, which called for emancipation of the Indians and freedom from all
that set them apart from other citizens of the United States.
Six months later, on June 1, 1955, the parties filed a stipulated statement
of facts, waiving their right to present further evidence and agreeing that the
defendants owed the plaintiff $81.22, reflecting the $361.22 owed when the
action was filed, less the $280 the defendants had paid on October 23 . On
June 13, Laurence Davis, a Phoenix attorney contracted to work half-time
348
for the Navajo Nation, joined the case as co-counsel. On June 20, the
342. See id.
343. Id. at 38.
344. Id. at 40-42.
345. See United States v. Waller, 243 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1917); United States v. Nice, 241
U.S. 591, 596, 601 (1916); Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 311-16 (1911).
346. Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456, 459, 463 (Ariz. 1948).
347. Transcript of Record, supra note 303, at 37, 42.
348. See id. at 42.
June 2011] 1505
Michigan Law Review
superior court dismissed the defendants' counterclaim, and ordered them to
pay the plaintiff $82.22.3a Neither the tribe nor the Williamses were ready to
accept the trial court's ruling. On August 17, the defendants filed a notice of
appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.aso
It was in the Arizona Supreme Court that the legal issues were most ful-
ly engaged. Neither party had the law clearly on their side. Worcester v.
Georgia"' provided the central precedent for the defendants. In the founda-
tional 1832 decision, the Supreme Court had held that Georgia's assertion of
jurisdiction over a non-Indian missionary on the Cherokee Reservation was
"repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States," and
that "the laws of Georgia can have no force" on the Cherokee Nation. 352 In
subsequent decisions, the Court had affirmed that states lacked taxing juris-
diction 3 3 and criminal jurisdiction 35 4 over tribal members on their lands. But
much had happened since 1832. Indians had become citizens,355 their lands
356
had been allotted, their people integrated with non-Indian communities,
and Congress had declared that it would no longer enter into treaties with
Indian nations.' Since the late-nineteenth century, the Court had held that
358 319
states could exercise taxing and criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
acting on Indian lands, and it was accepted that tribal members could sue
non-Indians in state court, even about matters as close to tribal sovereignty
as deprivation of land.36 And unlike cases concerning criminal jurisdiction
or property taxation, there was no history of federal legislation regarding
civil jurisdiction. Could Worcester's broad exclusion from state jurisdiction
still be valid?
Lower court authority suggested that it was not. It is true that in 1950 the
Arizona Supreme Court held in Begay v. Miller that state courts lacked ju-
risdiction to divorce a Navajo couple who had already been divorced in
tribal court, but the court made clear that its decision did not rest on a gen-
eral lack of subject matter jurisdiction but instead the distinctive domestic
349. Id. at 44-45. There is no explanation why the court added a dollar to the debt to which
the parties had stipulated; it was likely a factual error made in addition to the court's legal errors.
350. Id. at 45.
351. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
352. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
353. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867).
354. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
355. See Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (declaring all Indians born within the
United States to be citizens).
356. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (providing for the allotment of lands in
severalty to Indians on reservations).
357. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (declaring that hereafter tribes were not
powers with which the United States could make treaties).
358. See Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (upholding taxation of railroad lands
within an Indian reservation by the Territory of Idaho).
359. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
360. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892).
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361relations context and comity for the tribal court decree. More on point,
several other state courts had upheld jurisdiction over civil actions by non-
362Indians against Indians, at least two doing so in suits to collect on goods
sold to Indians on their reservations.363
Secondary authority was also of little help to the defendants. Corpus Ju-
ris Secundum stated bluntly that "an Indian may be sued in the state courts
in any matter over which the United States has not expressly retained juris-
diction."3M A 1930 Yale Law Journal article, The Indian Problem and the
Law, similarly stated that aside from domestic relations, property, and other
matters restricted by federal law, Indians were fully subject to state civil
jurisdiction. 365 Although Felix Cohen's 1941 Handbook of Federal Indian
Law stated powerfully that "state laws have no force within the territory of
an Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians,"3 66 it substantially qualified this
statement by declaring that "[i]n matters, not affecting either the Federal
Government or the tribal relations, an Indian has the same status to sue and
be sued in state courts as any other citizen."367 The Handbook even cited one
of the state cases upholding jurisdiction over a collection suit against an In-
dian to illustrate this proposition.36 Although the Handbook noted that no
state jurisdiction at all existed in states like Arizona whose enabling acts
disclaimed such jurisdiction,6  this was a slim reed to bear the weight of the
case alone.
361. Begay v. Miller, 222 P.2d 624, 629-30 (Ariz. 1950).
362. See, e.g., Plummer v. Hubbard, 201 N.Y.S. 747, 749 (N.Y App. Div. 1923) (citing
Stacy v. La Belle, 75 N.W. 60 (Wis. 1898)) ("In the absence of federal statute or existing treaty, or
state statute, a state court has jurisdiction of an action on contract in favor of a white man against an
Indian belonging to a tribe and a particular reservation."); Red Hawk v. Joines, 278 P. 572, 575 (Or.
1929) ("[A]n Indian may sue and be sued in the state courts in any matter over which Congress has
not expressly retained jurisdiction in the United States. Especially is this true where the Indian is a
citizen."); Stacy v. La Belle, 75 N.W. 60, 62 (Wis. 1898) ("In the absence of any federal statute or
treaty to the contrary, and upon the principles stated, we must hold that a state court may take juris-
diction of an action on contract in favor of a white man, and against an Indian belonging to a tribe
and a particular reservation.").
363. See Stevenson v. Christie, 42 S.W. 418 (Ark, 1897) (holding that state court had juris-
diction over action by white man who had become a citizen of the Cherokee Nation to collect a debt
against a Cherokee man for goods sold on the Cherokee Nation); Stacy, 75 N.W. 60 (holding that
state court had jurisdiction over suit by federal Indian trader to collect for goods sold to Menominee
Indian on Menominee Reservation); see also Tinker v. Midland Valley Mercantile Co., 105 P. 333
(Okla. 1909) (enforcing promissory note against Osage man for goods sold on credit without con-
sidering jurisdictional question), rev'd on other gmunds, 231 U.S. 681 (1914) (holding that
merchant should have bom burden of proof on question of statutory exemption).
364. Williams v. Lee, 319 P2d 998, 1001 (Ariz. 1958) (citing 42 C.J.S. Indians § 8(b)
(1944)), rev'd, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
365. Ray A. Brown, The Indian Problem and the Law, 39 YALE L.J. 307, 314-15 (1930).
366. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 116 (1941) (footnote omitted).
367. Id. at 379.
368. Id. at 379 n.177 (citing Stacy, 75 N.W. 60, among other authorities).
369. See id. at 382.
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Ironically, the strongest support for the continuing vitality of Worcester
came from Public Law 280,370 which Congress enacted while the case was
pending in superior court. In what was almost an afterthought in a statute
largely directed at criminal jurisdiction, Congress had included civil juris-
diction in the grant of jurisdiction to the states. The statute, along with the
abortive 1949 attempt to extend state "civil and criminal laws and court ju-
risdiction" over the Navajo Reservation, was perhaps the best evidence that
states lacked civil jurisdiction absent explicit congressional action. Still,
neither alone suggested that states lacked jurisdiction in commercial dis-
putes with non-Indians, which most lower courts assumed existed absent
congressional authorization. In fact, Congressman Fernandez's primary tar-
get in the 1949 amendment was jurisdiction over Navajo marriage and
divorce, an area in which authorities agreed that tribal jurisdiction was ex-
*372clusive.
In the Arizona Supreme Court, Lee's attorneys adopted the position of
the superior court, presenting the question as "[w]hether Appellants, as citi-
zens of the United States and residents of Arizona, may avoid their
contractual obligations by virtue of their being members of the Navajo Tribe
and residing on that Reservation."373 They claimed that the effect of the de-
fendants' argument that Indians possessed state voting rights but freedom
from state jurisdiction was to make Indians "a special class of citizens, a
thing foreign to our concept of democracy."3 74 Invoking the arguments of
termination, they contended that Indian exemptions from state jurisdiction
were the product of treating Indians as a "conquered race" that was "not
considered to have equal rights."375 "Present trends and thinking," they de-
clared, had "outmoded what is presently an antiquated approach."3 76
The defendants, in contrast, emphasized the rights of Indian tribes to
self-government, derived from their inherent sovereignty, protected by trea-
ties, and recognized in Worcester v. Georgia over a century earlier. 77 They
used both Truman's veto of the extension of state jurisdiction through the
Rehabilitation Act and the congressional provision of a means to assume
state jurisdiction through Public Law 280 to bolster their claims that there
was no such jurisdiction in the absence of federal law.37 ' They rejected the
370. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162,
28 U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326).
371. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
372. Navajo and Hopi Rehabilitation: Hearing on H.R. 3476, Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Pub. Lands, 81st Cong. 203 (1949) (statement of Hon. Antonio
N. Fernandez, Rep. of New Mexico).
373. Appellee's Answering Brief at 4, Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998 (Ariz. 1958) (No.
6172).
374. Id. at 17.
375. Id. at 19.
376. Id. at 22.
377. Appellants' Opening Brief at 6-9, Williams, 319 P.2d 998 (No. 6172).
378. Id. at 11-12, 15-17.
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contention that citizenship or equality required state jurisdiction: the Nava-
jos were not asking for a special status but rather for the same status any
member of a polity had within her own territory.3 7 9 When Navajos left the
reservation they were fully subject to state law, but their activities within
their own territories were subject only to the jurisdiction of those territo-
. 380
nies .
On January 7, 1958, the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected these argu-
ments, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum.381' The court nevertheless reversed
the lower court, holding that a federal regulation of traders providing that
"the buying of livestock and livestock products ... shall be covered by spe-
cial permits issued by the superintendent"' preempted the attachment sale
of the livestock."' The State of Arizona had followed the case closely and
rejoiced at the result. The Arizona attorney general issued a celebratory
press release before the tribal attorneys had even received the opinion.i The
state quickly sent officials to the Navajo government, demanding to review
Navajo records. 385 Although they were rebuffed, it was clear that they were
coming back.
On January 16, Norman Littell met with the Advisory Committee of the
Navajo Council to request permission to seek certiorari and retain a Su-
preme Court specialist to assist with the case. For Littell and Paul Jones, the
assimilationist chairman of the tribe, the case was all about the threat of tax-
ation posed by the decision.18' But other council members saw a broader
threat to the Navajo people. Roger Davis, who in 1949 had been indifferent
to the extension of state jurisdiction, declared that,
[T]his case has been hanging fire for a long, long time in the Arizona
court, and many of the Navajos have wanted to know what happened to it,
and now that the case has been decided-what will the Navajos say? And I
think it is the best thing that it should go on."
Similarly council member Howard Sorrell emphasized "the necessity for us
to act at this time . ... [W]e wish to block anything like this coming on to
our Reservation while the people are not prepared to cope with it.388 The
379. Reply Brief of Appellants at 15-20, Williams, 319 P.2d 998 (No. 6172).
380. Id.
381. Williams, 319 P.2d at 1001.
382. Id. at 1003 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 277.13 (1957)).
383. Id. The defendants had made this argument but had not relied on it. According to Larry
Davis, "We threw that thing in the brief just thinking it was probably the weakest thing in the whole
brief, and it is the one point that the court seized upon." Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 250
(Jan. 16, 1958).
384. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 243 (Jan. 16. 1958).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 243-246.
387. Id. at 248
388. Id.
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committee unanimously voted to provide funding for the Supreme Court
petition."'
C. Williams v. Lee in the Supreme Court
Williams came to a Supreme Court facing one of its greatest showdowns
over state sovereignty. The much-delayed implementation of its 1954 deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education had met with both massive popular
resistance in the South and academic attack from progressive scholars.O In
the fall of 1958, the Court was forced to issue its opinion in Cooper v. Aaron
to affirm the states' obligation to implement the Court's opinions. 9 ' Under
these circumstances, the Williamses' demand to be exempt from state juris-
diction in a contract dispute might at best appear irrelevant and at worst
seem to affirm separatism over equality. But Justice Black saw the impor-
tance of the opinion and its counterintuitive link to Brown.
Norman Littell filed the petition for certiorari in Williams on February
26, 1958.192 A week earlier, on February 20, the Little Rock School Board
had filed its request for a stay of federal desegregation orders. The previ-
ous fall, Governor Faubus had ordered the Arkansas National Guard to Little
Rock to prevent nine black school children from entering the Little Rock
High School. 394 The students only entered three weeks later, after President
Eisenhower ordered the guard to stand down and sent Army troops to the
high school.39' Throughout the school year, first Army soldiers and then fed-
396eralized National Guard troops patrolled the school to prevent violence. In
June 1958, the Arkansas district court in Aaron v. Cooper found that the
situation caused irreparable harm to education and stayed implementation of
desegregation until the 1960-1961 school year. The Eighth Circuit re-
versed, and in September 1958 the Court held an emergency session to hear
the case before school resumed.'9 Two weeks later, the Court issued the
unanimous opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, forcefully affirming federal suprem-
acy in constitutional law.399
389. Id. at 249.
390. See David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1065,
1070-75, 1076-78 (2008).
391. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
392. Transcript of Record, supra note 303.
393. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12.
394. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 36 (8th Cir. 1958).
395. Strauss, supra note 390, at 1078.
396. Id.
397. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 26, 28 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
398. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4-5.
399. 358 U.S. 1.
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It is not clear why the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Williams,
since the lower court had in fact reversed the writ of attachment.400 Neither
the petitioners nor the federal government thought the issue important
enough to submit a brief regarding the petition for review. In fact, the clerk
who summarized the certiorari petition for Justice Douglas tentatively sug-
gested that the Court deny review:
Petitioners contend that this is the most important Indian case in ma[n]y
years. I frankly do not know. I do not feel any alarm at requiring Indians to
submit to state court jurisdiction in civil suits until Congress decrees oth-
erwise. Deny (?)4'
Chief Justice Warren's clerk, in contrast, called this an "important area of
federal administration" and recommended that certiorari be granted "upon
the belief that this problem could be common to any Indian reservation."
402
It is more surprising that the Court issued the strong statement of inher-
ent tribal sovereignty that it did. Although Davis and Ferguson's briefs to
the Arizona Supreme Court dwelt on the rights of the Navajo people as an
"independent political community," which had since "time immemorial ...
exercised political and governmental jurisdiction over its members,"4 0 3 Lit-
tell's Supreme Court briefs drained the blood from these arguments. They
focused instead on Congress's absolute power to abrogate tribal immunity
from state jurisdiction and the alleged preemptive power of federal laws
404
extending state jurisdiction in other contexts.
The U.S. Solicitor General, invited by the Court to submit a brief in the
case,405 did even less to make an argument for inherent sovereignty.406 This
was not surprising. A few months before, the Office of the Solicitor of the
Interior Department had issued the 1958 revision of the Handbook of
400. Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998, 1003 (Ariz. 1958).
401. Summary of Williams v. Lee Cert. Petition (No. 39) (Apr. 8, 1958), in William 0.
Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1201, Folder 2.
402. Undated Memorandum from DMC at 3, in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress,
Box 188.
403. Appellants' Opening Brief at 7-8, Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998 (Ariz. 1958) (No.
6172).
404. Brief for Petitioner at 11-15, 19-21, Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (No. 39). The brief also
revealed Littell's personal biases regarding state jurisdiction by declaring that Congress had ex-
tended state jurisdiction when it "considers that a particular tribe of Indians have so far advanced in
adaptability as to be able to assume all of the duties of citizenship." Id. at 11.
405. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Williams, 358
U.S. 217 (No. 39).
406. Interestingly, J. Lee Rankin, famous for his championship of civil rights in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was the
solicitor general named on this brief dismissing the rights of Indians. But the arguments in the brief
were likely more the work of the two attorneys from the Department of Justice Lands Division on
the brief, Perry L. Morton and Roger Marquis, who had written a brief in New York ex rel. Ray v.
Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946), opining that "all authority over Indian lands not necessary to the
proper exercise of federal jurisdiction is reserved to the state within which the land lies." Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S.
496 (1946) at 6.
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Federal Indian Law. Where Cohen's chapter on state jurisdiction had
opened by declaring that "state laws have no force within the territory of an
Indian tribe in matters affecting Indians,"407 the new opening statement was
that "[f]ederal power has been interposed so that State laws generally have
had little force within the territory of an Indian tribe in matters affecting
Indians."4os The Handbook forthrightly admitted that the shift in federal pol-
icy was behind this diluted language:
Present Federal policy calls for the termination of Federal supervision of
affairs of Indian tribes desiring such termination, to the extent practicable
and as soon as termination is feasible. Any discussion of the scope of State
power over Indian affairs must take that policy, and measures taken to ef-
fectuate it, into consideration.4
The 1958 Handbook nevertheless proclaimed that "[s]tate law does not
apply to Indian affairs except so far as, and to the extent that, the United
States gives or has given its consent."41 0 The solicitor general's brief in the
Supreme Court did not admit to even this much. The solicitor general re-
jected the petitioners' basic argument, declaring that "[w]e do not agree that
reservation Indians are beyond the reach of all state law until Congress spe-
cifically provides otherwise."4 11 It quoted recent cases establishing the right
of Indians to vote and receive social security benefits as "examples of appli-
cation of state laws to reservation Indians."412 The brief also opined that the
president's veto of the Fernandez Amendment and Congress's passage of
Public Law 280 did not diminish the "reserved jurisdiction which the states
already possessed."413
The solicitor general did agree that the court below should be reversed,
but only on the narrowest of grounds. It argued that the federal regulation
that extension of credit "will be at the trader's own risk" divested state
courts of jurisdiction.4 14 (Although the appellants had made this argument in
the state courts and cited it in their petition for certiorari, they had since
withdrawn from this position, saying newly discovered history of the regula-
tion did not support it.)4 15 The tribe's attorneys replied in an effort to repair
407. COHEN, supra note 366, at 116.
408. OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 502
(1958) (footnote omitted).
409. Id. at 501 (footnote omitted).
410. Id.
411. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 408, at 5.
412. Id. at 6.
413. Id. at 7 n.4.
414. Id. at 2 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 252.17 (1957)).
415. A bench memo to Chief Justice Warren questioned this position, saying:
I can't understand the reason for this concession except that the petr's brief seems more con-
cemed with making law than with winning the particular case before the Court-which
involves $82. The petr is determined to win on the broad ground that there is no jurisdiction at
all in the state courts in any case involving Indians on a reservation.
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the damage, noting that "inasmuch as the solicitor general appears here on
behalf of the United States, petitioners' guardian, we can only conclude by
regretfully repeating the classic query, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes-who
shall guard the guardians themselves?" 416
The respondent's brief challenged the existence of any Navajo sover-
eignty at all. The brief argued that invocation of Worcester v. Georgia was
inappropriate because, unlike the Cherokee Nation, when the "the Navajos
became a part of the United States there was no such thing as a Navajo Tribe
in the political sense."4 7 Treaties were made with "headmen" lacking any
coercive powers, who were replaced by "puppet headmen" should they fail
to accomplish the federal will.4 18 Citing the federal government's 1923 or-
ganization of the Navajo council, the state declared that "[t]he political
entity known as the Navajo Tribe was an artificial creature of the federal
government, not a recognized nation as was the Cherokee."1 (This assertion
was particularly ironic coming as it did in the midst of a resurgence of Na-
vajo exercise of sovereignty.)
Much of the November 20th argument in the case was consumed with
420
procedural questions. Justice Whittaker was particularly concerned with
whether the defendants had waived immunity from jurisdiction by partici-
pating in the state court action and even filing a counterclaim.421 This led to a
more important question: Did the petitioners argue that the state court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute or personal jurisdiction
over the defendants?422 Littell could not quite answer this question: some-
times he said they lacked personal jurisdiction, sometimes subject-matter
jurisdiction, and when challenged he ultimately asked to throw himself on
the mercy of the Supreme Court and have this question resolved in cham-
421bers. Still, Littell was comfortable and confident, presenting a coherent
argument about the effect of Worcester and Public Law 280.424
William Stevenson for the respondent was less poised, pausing to shuffle
through his papers for the reasoning of Worcester, stumbling over the effect
of Public Law 280, and occasionally reciting principles that in fact helped
Undated Bench Memo, in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 188, MAF.
416. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 9, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (No. 39).
417. Brief for the Respondent at 7, Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (No. 39) (quoting NAVAJO
AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE NAVAJO YEARBOOK OF PLANNING IN ACTION 112 (Ro-
bert W. Young ed., Report No. V 1955)).
418. Id. at 8 (quoting NAVAJO AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE NAVAJO YEAR-
BOOK OF PLANNING IN ACTION 112 (Robert W. Young ed., Report No. V 1955)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
419. Id.
420. Oral Argument, Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (No. 39), available at National Archives, RG
267 (transcribed from audio recording by author).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See id.
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his opponent.42 He sought to build his case on the way things had changed
since Worcester was decided, and particularly on Navajos' greater
assumption of state rights.426 The Navajo had "insisted on his right to vote,"
and Navajos could and indeed had run for positions on the Board of Super-
visors for Apache County, which included part of the Navajo Nation.427 This
was a dangerous argument for a Court that had just ruled for federal su-
premacy in Cooper v. Aaron, and one justice responded by asking whether
"these changes haven't affected the broad constitutional relationship be-
tween the federal government and the states, vis-a-vis Indians have they?" 428
Another potential key turning point in the argument may have come
from Littell's last minute effort to rebut the solicitor general's suggestion
that the regulation placing extension of credit at the trader's own risk di-
vested any court of jurisdiction over collection of resulting debts. In order to
show that tribal courts could and in fact did exercise jurisdiction over such
actions, Littell presented a list of 215 cases traders had filed in the Navajo
courts in the last few months.429 The list drew great interest, and some con-
fusion, from the bench. Chief Justice Warren initially assumed it was a list
of 215 state court cases, and was surprised to be corrected.430 Justice Hugo
Black, who would author the opinion, asked detailed questions about the
legal foundation for tribal courts.43 1 Others asked whether their decisions
were final, how the judges were selected, and whether they applied tribal
custom. Although Littell could not discuss the courts without mentioning
their "very marked limitations,"432 he may have helped his case in ways he
could not have imagined by discussing the tribe's efforts to improve them.
Meeting in conference to discuss the case, all but one Justice voted to
reverse the opinion below, but some favored doing so on narrow statutory
grounds.433 For most of the Justices, Williams was likely a "nothing case,"4
far removed from the momentous questions raised by the implementation of
Brown. But Justice Hugo Black, who wrote the opinion for the Court, saw a
paradoxical link between the two cases. Justice Black was perhaps the Jus-
tice who had thought most deeply about his commitment to civil rights.
Black was from Alabama, the heart of the segregated South, and had even
briefly become a member of the Ku Klux Klan to gain political support in
425. See id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. See William J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Part I, Box 15, Folder 4.
434. Interview with Judge Guido Calabresi, in New Haven, Conn. (Dec. 29, 2008). Indeed,
Judge William Canby, now the leading federal jurist in Indian law, but then a clerk for Justice
Whittaker, could not recall a single conversation among the other law clerks or with his Justice
regarding the case. Telephone interview with Judge William Canby (Apr. 6, 2011).
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his campaign for the Senate in the 1920s.435 Firmly behind Brown v. Board
of Education4 16 and a key member of the liberal Warren court, Black had
taken much fire for his support of integration. In 1959, the Alabama Senate
actually passed a resolution declaring it to be their sense that his remains
should not be mingled with the Alabama soil.437
Nor was Black insensible to the apparent incongruence between deseg-
regation for African-Americans and separate institutions for Indians. During
oral argument in Brown v. Board of Education he had asked what a decision
abolishing the doctrine of separate-but-equal would mean for separate In-
dian schools.438 Showing the confusion of the Justices and civil rights
attorneys on the status of the Indian, when Justice Jackson continued this
line of questioning, future Justice Thurgood Marshall declared that he
thought those schools' policy would be overturned, but that "the Indians ...
just have not had the judgment or the wherewithal to bring lawsuits." 43 9
In considering Williams v. Lee, Justice Black was forced to consider
whether integration was necessarily the way to respect the rights of all op-
pressed racial groups. According to Judge Guido Calabresi, who was Justice
Black's clerk when Williams was decided, the case made Black realize that
there were some minority groups that really wanted to be "separate and in-
dependent and themselves." 0 Although the appellants' briefs in the U.S.
Supreme Court barely mentioned tribal self-government, Justice Black saw
in the case the insistence on tribal independence that the Court had recog-
nized in Worcester v. Georgia, that the United States had promised to the
Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and that was now being reflected in the de-
velopment of the Navajo courts.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court drew some language directly from
the briefs to the Arizona Supreme Court, but also developed arguments and
facts that appeared nowhere in the record. The opinion had the structure and
some of the spirit of Worcester v. Georgia."' As in Worcester, the starting
point was the initial independent sovereignty of Indian tribes: "Originally
the Indian tribes were separate nations within what is now the United
States."42 Although the tribes had been forced to give up "complete inde-
pendence" in exchange for a measure of self-government and land, they had
retained their freedom from state jurisdiction." Calling Worcester one of
435. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 91-93 (Fordham Univ. Press, 2d ed.
1997) (1994).
436. Id. at 431-32.
437. Id. at 443.
438. See BROWN v. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT 29 (Leon Friedman ed., 2004).
439. Id. at 50.
440. Interview with Judge Guido Calabresi, supra note 434.
441. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
442. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218 (1959).
443. Id.
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Chief Justice Marshall's "most courageous and eloquent opinions," the
Court stated that "[d]espite bitter criticism and the defiance of Georgia
which refused to obey this Court's mandate in Worcester the broad
principles of that decision came to be accepted as law."4" Although state law
was no longer absolutely excluded, "the basic policy of Worcester has re-
mained.""' Thus state jurisdiction was barred except "where essential tribal
relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be
jeopardized," such as suits by Indians against non-Indians in state courts and
criminal jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians."6 But where state
law would undermine the rights of Indians or the authority of their govern-
ment, the basic policy of Worcester remained in force. "Essentially," the
Court declared, "the question has always been whether the state action in-
fringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them.""7 Although later courts have interpreted the phrase nar-
rowly, the context suggests that the state was excluded from all
jurisdiction over Indian affairs." 9
In light of these principles, federal statutes were not the source of the
exclusion of state law but rather evidence of "the assumption that the States
have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation."45 0 The
opinion was careful not to limit Congress's power with respect to Indian
tribes. Justice Black, after all, had been a senator and core supporter of ex-
pansive federal powers under the New Deal. 451' But the opinion emphasized
the New Deal policies of encouraging "tribal governments and courts to
become stronger and more highly organized" even as it also sanctioned the
termination "policy calculated eventually to make all Indians full-fledged
444. Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 220.
448. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360-61 (2001); McClanahan v. Arizona, 484 P.2d
221, 223-24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
449. This conclusion is supported by the case cited to support the statement, a cf citation to
Utah & Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885), in which the Court held that the Idaho
territory could tax the property of a railroad on a right of way granted it by the federal government
on an Indian reservation. The Court specified that the tax did not interfere with any rights of the
Indians, and the terms of the federal acquisition of the taxed property from the tribe effectively
withdrew the land from the reservation. Id. at 32. Utah & Northern Railway thus stands for the
proposition that the state may have jurisdiction when no rights or interests of reservation Indians are
affected. Professor Richard Pomp, in his exhaustive and penetrating examination of the caselaw on
state jurisdiction in Indian country, severely criticizes Williams for stating the test in this fashion,
when the rest of the opinion endorses a far broader exclusion of the state from Indian affairs. Rich-
ard D. Pomp, The Unfidfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX
LAW. 897, 998-1004 (2010). As he points out, the language sanctioned courts in exercising discre-
tion to determine whether there was state jurisdiction in Indian country without explicit
congressional approval. Id. at 1000-02. While acknowledging the force of his critique, I would
argue that a proper reading of Williams would find state jurisdiction excluded in all areas impacting
tribal institutions and individuals; the fault this lies more with later courts than the opinion itself.
450. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
451. NEWMAN, supra note 435, at 228.
1516 [Vol. 109:1463
The Debate over Indian Equality
participants in American society" as soon as Indians could assume this sta-
tus without disadvantage.452 But all of the Termination Era statutes extending
state jurisdiction over reservations, which the Court might have cited as evi-
dence for a general federal support for state jurisdiction, instead
demonstrated that when Congress desired that states exercise this power "it
has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which Worcester v. Georgia had
denied." 453
The Court found that the relationship between the Navajos and the Unit-
ed States showed "no departure" from these general principles, developing
the importance of the Treaty of 1868 in this regard.454 The treaty was indeed
sacred to the Navajo people; its signing marked the release of the tribe from
their confinement at Fort Sumter in Bosque Redondo, New Mexico, and the
guarantee that they would never again be forced from their homeland.4 ' Al-
though the petitioners' briefs had cited the treaty in support of the concept of
exclusion of state law, Justice Black's opinion was the first to set forth the
history of the treaty, which was signed when the Navajos were an "exiled
people, forced by the United States to live crowded together on a small
piece of land on the Pecos River in eastern New Mexico, some 300 miles
east of the area they had occupied before the coming of the white man."456
This history and the struggle it symbolized contributed to the Court's broad
reading of the treaty language that simply "set apart" the reservation for the
Navajos' "permanent home" and prohibited all but government officials
from entering.457 These terms, the Court found, included an "understanding
that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the juris-
diction of whatever tribal government existed."458
Federal efforts to strengthen the Navajo government and courts under
the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act demonstrated continuing support for
this promise.459 President Truman's veto of the rehabilitation bill that would
have imposed state jurisdiction did so as well.460 The Court also emphasized
461
the efforts of the Navajo tribe in recent years to develop its court system.
In the last decade of Navajo action, the tribal government had considered
and almost approved state jurisdiction, rejected it in light of the opposition
of the Navajo people, and then dedicated its own funds to its legal system in
452. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
453. Id. at 221.
454. Id.
455. See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Do-
mestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1127 (2004).
456. Williams, 358 U.S. at 221.
457. Treaty with the Navajo Indians, arts. 2 & 13, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
458. Williams, 358 U.S. at 221-22.
459. Id. at 222.
460. Id. at 222 n.9.
461. Id. at 222.
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part to ward off state jurisdiction, which all contributed to the tribe's ulti-
mate success in Williams.
Most interestingly, the opinion emphasized the link between the case
and the viability of tribal institutions. After all, if self-government was
narrowly understood, one might doubt that jurisdiction over this wholly pri-
vate contract dispute would interfere with it. The parties had not argued that
any Navajo law conflicted with Arizona law regarding the contract. In fact,
in 1956 the Navajo Council had enacted a law permitting attachment of all
but the first seventy-five sheep to collect on a debt.462 But the Court, perhaps
recognizing the challenges of developing a functioning tribal legal system,
found that the very fact of concurrent jurisdiction would undermine tribal
institutions: "There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdic-
tion here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern them-
selves."4 63 This simple contract case, in other words, involved not just the
rights of the plaintiff and the defendants, or even the rights of state and federal
governments, but also the social and political fabric of the tribe. That being
the case, the Court declared as follows:
It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reserva-
tion and the transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in this
Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over
their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the Navajos in the
Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this power is to be taken
away from them, it is for Congress to do it.46
The other Justices unanimously approved the opinion. Several noted that
it was a "fine" or "interesting" opinion, but did not otherwise comment. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, however, wrote Black, "I agree with every word, especially
your essay on Brown v. Board of Education."465 Black was gleeful that
Frankfurter had caught his hidden meaning: "There," he told his clerk,
"that's why I say Felix is the brightest man on the Court." 4 66 Black had seen
in the initial bitter resistance to Worcester v. Georgia and its acceptance as a
principle of law over a century later a vindication of the Court's actions in
Brown.467 He had a deep faith in the law-not as a matter of pure text or
precedent, but its underlying logic and justice-and saw in both Worcester
462. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 130, 143 (July 19, 1956).
463. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
464. Id. (citations omitted).
465. Interview with Judge Guido Calabresi, supra note 434; accord NEWMAN, supra note
435, at 483 (quoting remark but not identifying the context).
466. NEWMAN, supra note 435, at 483.
467. See Interview with Judge Guido Calabresi, supra note 434. More recently, Justice
Breyer also linked Worcester and Brown as defining moments in the Court's exercise of judicial
review in the face of popular opposition. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A
JUDGE'S VIEW 1-2 (2010).
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and Brown an essential rightness on the law that would be vindicated by
*468time.
V. THE AFTERMATH OF WILLIAMS V LEE
At the end of World War II, both Indian and non-Indian communities
had embraced the idea of Indian equality with a new passion. The question
was what Indian equality would mean and whether it could co-exist with the
notion of the Indian tribe. By 1961, Native opinion was clear on this point:
equality meant not only equal treatment of Indian people when they partici-
pated in off-reservation society but also respect for tribes, for their rights,
and for their status as self-determining governments within the American
system. By 1970, this consensus would become the basis of a new federal
Indian policy. Williams provided a legal foundation for these tribal and fed-
eral efforts, supporting further rejections of state jurisdiction and affirming
the independence of tribal institutions. But now, both in the Court and in
popular debate, the self-governance principle is once again under attack on
the grounds that it is special, unfair, and inconsistent with equality and de-
mocracy in the United States. This section discusses the impact of and
challenges to the legacy of Williams v. Lee.
On June 3, 1961, 800 Indians, including 467 delegates from 90 tribes,
gathered for the American Indian Chicago Conference.469 The resulting Dec-
laration of Indian Purpose called termination a "program of destroying
Indian resources, of denying Indian aspirations, and arbitrarily relieving the
Federal government of responsibility for specific tribes or in specific areas
of interest" and called on the government to abandon the policy in favor of
one based on a "broad educational process as the procedure best calculated
to remove the disabilities which have prevented Indians from making full
use of their resources."470
In 1970, President Nixon embraced these goals, calling for a policy of
"self-determination without termination."471' His announcement made clear
that this new policy was a matter of basic equality, describing Indians as
"the most deprived and most isolated minority group in our nation," whose
current state was "the heritage of centuries of injustice" in which "American
Indians have been oppressed and brutalized, deprived of their ancestral lands
and denied the opportunity to control their own destiny."a4 " The response to
this injustice had to be a "new era in which the Indian future is determined
by Indian acts and Indian decisions."473 The result was the Self-Determination
468. Id.
469. CLARKIN, supra note 86, at 1.
470. Id. at 18.
471. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, supra note 127, at 365.
472. Id. at 364.
473. Id. at 365.
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Era, which continues to guide congressional and executive Indian decision
making today.474
Williams v. Lee helped provide the legal foundation for this policy, in
both Congress475 and the Court. It immediately provided important support
for two further Navajo fights for immunity from state jurisdiction. Even as
Williams was pending, the Navajo council and its attorneys had begun dis-
cussing the dispute that would become Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Commission.47 6 Still frustrated with its inability to tax the Navajo
people or tribe directly, the state started to tax the gross sales of non-Indian
traders on the reservation.477 In August of 1958, after certiorari had been
478
granted in Williams, Warren Trading Post challenged the tax. In 1965, in
another opinion by Justice Black, the Court invalidated the tax.479 Although
the opinion is often understood as turning on "comprehensive federal regu-
lation" of traders, the existing regulations-licensing traders and authorizing
48an unexercised power to set prices -were not clearly inconsistent with
state taxation. This was a far cry from the kind of "occupation of the field"
the Court has demanded outside the Indian context to find state preemp-
4811tion. One can only understand the opinion if the burden was on the state to
establish that its laws "clearly do not interfere with federal policies concern-
ing the reservations."482 Under this standard, the broad federal regulatory
power over trading with Indians, combined with the general exclusion of
state law from reservations, meant that the state taxes violated federal law.
Eight years later, the continuing struggle with Arizona over jurisdiction
produced McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.483 Rosalind
McClanahan, then an eighteen-year-old teller at a bank on the reservation,
began the lawsuit when she wondered whether the state could really claim
$16.20 of her yearly income. DNA-People's Legal Services represented her
in the Supreme Court and ultimately won a decision that the state could not
tax an Indian for her income earned in Indian country.484 As in Warren Trad-
474. See, e.g., ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 50, at 155.
475. See, e.g., P.L. 106-179, Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encour-
agement Act, S. Rep. No. 106-150 at 11-12 (1999); P.L. 102-137, Making Permanent the
Legislative Reinstatement, Following the Decision of Duro against Reina (58 U.S.L.W. 4643, May
29, 1990), of the Power of Indian Tribes to Exercise Jurisdiction over Indians, S. REP. No. 102-153
at 32, 43-44; P.L. 95-608, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 95-1386 at 15 (1978).
476. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
477. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 71 (Feb. 5, 1958).
478. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. 685 (No. 115).
479. See Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. 685.
480. See id. at 688-90.
481. See, e.g., N.Y State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (holding that state law charging higher fees to commercial insurers than
government insurers was not preempted by ERISA, a law comprehensively regulating employee
benefits and expressly preempting any state law "relating to" employee benefit plans).
482. Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 687 n.3.
483. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
484. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164.
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ing Post, the Court discussed self-government but ostensibly rested its deci-
sion on federal preemption. Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court even
declared (without citing a supporting case) that "the trend has been away
from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and
toward reliance on federal pre-emption."05 Still, the decision makes little
sense without the Williams assumption that state law is generally excluded
from reservation affairs. No statute, treaty, or policy spoke specifically to
taxation of income; only the Court's broad reading of the 1868 treaty and
the Arizona enabling act as preserving Navajo independence from state ju-
risdiction could lead to this result.486 Thus, the opinion, while understood to
provide a separate test for the exclusion of state jurisdiction, in fact builds
on Williams's distinctive assumptions and reading of the relevant law.
In 1976, Williams served as a central precedent in Fisher v. District
Court, in which the Court held that a state could not exercise jurisdiction
over a custody dispute between Blackfeet Indians domiciled on the Black-
feet reservation.4 ' Fisher provided legal grounding for the Indian Child
488Welfare Act of 1978, which secured and broadened tribal court jurisdic-
tion over foster care, adoption, and other placement disputes involving
Indian children. 489 But 1976 also saw a significant blow to the force of Wil-
liams in disputes over state jurisdiction where the subject of jurisdiction was
not a tribal member. In that year, Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes dismissed the relevance of the Williams protection of tribal self-
government to a tribal member's challenge to state taxation of his cigarette
sales to non-Indians.4 90 In 1980, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes, the
Court built on Moe to hold that even when tribes themselves managed ciga-
rette sales, and even when the income from sales and taxation of those
cigarettes was the main support for the tribal government, neither the princi-
ple of self-government nor the existence of federal laws encouraging the
business in question prohibited the tax.49 Williams, however, may have in-
fluenced Washington's suggestion that tribal businesses will sometimes be
immune from state law if on-reservation efforts by tribes or their members
significantly contribute to the value they sell,492 and Williams clearly
485. Id. at 172.
486. See id. at 173-76.
487. See 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam).
488. Pub. L. 95-608, 93 Stat. 3069 (codified in scattered sections throughout 25 U.S.C.).
489. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-23 (2006).
490. 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976). Moe was apparently the product of the Court's traditional
disregard for Indian law cases and Justice Rehnquist's disregard for the current state of Indian law.
Then a relatively junior member of the Court, Justice Rehnquist was assigned the case as punish-
ment for a skit that displeased Chief Justice Burger. An Arizona native with "nothing but contempt
for Indian cases," he used the opinion to reverse the decades of earlier trends on the Court. BOB
WOODWARD & ScorT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 500 (rev. ed.
2005).
491. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
492. See Washington, 447 U.S. at 156-57. This value-added test has since been incorpo-
rated as part of the preemption test, see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
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influenced the broader principle that federal laws need not expressly pro-
hibit state jurisdiction to exclude it.493 Together, these principles have led to
decisions prohibiting imposition of state laws on non-Indians hunting tri-
bally-managed game,494 state taxation of non-Indians contracting with tribal
timber industries and schools,495 and even state regulation of tribal gaming.496
Still, the parsimonious interpretation of self-government in more recent cas-
es has greatly limited the relevance of Williams in such disputes.497
Similarly, Williams has played a significant but not insurmountable role
in the protection of tribal court authority. In 1978, the Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez used Williams to hold that there was no non-habeas fed-
eral cause of action to review Indian Civil Rights Act claims against tribes,
and that tribal institutions were appropriate fora to hear such claims.4 98 That
same year, United States v. Wheeler relied in part on Williams to hold that
the Navajo judicial power was an exercise of its inherent sovereignty, and
therefore was not limited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 49 9 But that year the Court also decided Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, holding that although no federal law or treaty removed tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, tribes nevertheless lacked such juris-
diction because it was "inconsistent with their status" as Indian tribes.50
Subsequent cases regarding civil jurisdiction over nonmembers have not
wholly denied such jurisdiction but have severely limited it. In Williams, the
Court declared the fact that Hugh Lee was non-Indian to be "immaterial"
and held that, to avoid undermining tribal court authority over reservation
affairs, tribal court jurisdiction over an action involving tribal members and
arising on the reservation was not only present but exclusive;' this holding
202, 219 (1987), but its lack of relation to anything having to do with congressional intent or statu-
tory language, and the fact that the Willians test is cited at the beginning of the paragraph
establishing the test, suggests that the test is an expression of the Williams self-government principle
rather than of preemption.
493. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 150-51 (1980).
494. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
495. See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. 136.
496. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202.
497. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (holding that
the state could tax oil and gas revenues from lessees of tribal lands although the tax was on tribally
owned resources and oil and gas development was almost exclusively managed by the federal and
tribal governments).
498. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
499. 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978) ("[Ilmplicit [in the Navajo Treaty] was the understanding
that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal
government existed." (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959)).
500. 435 U.S. 201, 208-11 (1978). The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, had noted that Williams
stated in dicta that "if the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly
conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive," Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007,
1010 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220), and upheld jurisdiction based on the prin-
ciple, also relied on in Williams, that tribes retained their rights of self-government until expressly
divested of those rights by Congress. See Oliphant, 544 F.2d at 1009 n. 1.
501. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220, 223 (1959).
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would seem to prevent limitations on such jurisdiction. Indeed, two cases in
the 1980s relied on Williams to hold that civil court jurisdiction over non-
Indians was broader than criminal jurisdictiono2 and that protecting tribal
court jurisdiction was an important part of the federal policy of supporting
tribal self-government.o
Most other cases, however, have ignored the Court's actual rationale in
Williams and held that it stands for nothing more than the principle that In-
dian tribes have jurisdiction over non-Indians who have entered into
consensual relationships with tribes or their members.' 4 The first case limit-
ing civil jurisdiction did rely on Williams in finding that tribes have
jurisdiction over nonmembers where necessary to protect their rights to
make their own laws and to be ruled by those laws, and also where non-
member actions would have a direct effect on the tribe or its members.a5 But
the Supreme Court has understood what actually affects tribal self-
government so narrowly that it has never found jurisdiction on this
ground-not when non-Indians driving on reservations caused serious inju-
ries,'6 not when non-Indian officers searched and damaged property in a
tribal home,o and not when a non-Indian bank foreclosed on reservation
land after offering the owners less favorable terms because of their concerns
about dealing with an Indian business.0 ' Indeed, these cases have inverted
Williams's admonition that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over mat-
ters that infringe on tribal self-government into a rule that tribal jurisdiction
will only exist where the case seriously infringes on self-government.509
The cases emasculating Williams have been marked by discomfort with
the very idea that Williams reaffirmed: that tribes have the right to govem
their territories, even when nonmembers might be affected as a result. The
opinions portray this right as special, unequal, and unfair. One sees this al-
ready in Justice Rehnquist's comments in the conference on McClanahan,
arguing that the income tax should be permitted because "Indians should not
get a free ride."o Suggestions of unfairness played a more dispositive role
in subsequent cases. Thus, although states and cities lower tax rates as an
incentive to encourage non-resident shopping, when tribes do so it is con-
demned as unfairly "market[ing] an exemption from state taxation."' And
502. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987); Nat'1 Farmers Union
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985).
503. See Iowa Mut. Ins., 480 U.S. at 14; Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856.
504. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1997).
505. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981).
506. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58.
507. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
508. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
509. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 331-32; Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
510. Conference Notes for McClanahan v. Arizona (Dec. 15, 1972), in William 0. Douglas
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1574.
511. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980).
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while all other governments punish non-citizens who commit crimes in their
territory, when tribes seek to do so their action is portrayed as an "unwar-
ranted intrusion[] on [the non-Indians'] personal liberty."5 2 And when a
tribal court seeks to hear a personal injury action against a driver who seri-
ously injured a reservation resident while working on the reservation, the
Supreme Court declares that the non-Indian defendant should not be forced
to defend against a "commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfa-
miliar court."5" Tribal self-governance rights are different, narrow, and
necessarily limited to those areas the Court considers uniquely tribal.
The notion that there is something just unfair about the idea of tribes as
governments with separate rights from other citizens is expressed more
starkly outside the Court. In challenging tribal land claims in northern New
York, Upstate Citizens for Equality dots the roads with signs proclaiming
"No Sovereign Nation, No Reservation"514 and insists that the extension of
citizenship to Indians means that federal Indian policy constitutes unconsti-
tutional discrimination. 15 Similarly, in protesting against treaty fishing
rights in Wisconsin, Stop Treaty Abuse created a promotional beer can
showing a walleye being speared from below with the slogan "Land Claims,
Fishing Rights, Hunting Rights, Water Rights, Equal Rights?"'16 Nor is this
the province of isolated protesters. On December 17, 2009, a Wall Street
Journal editorial blasted the Akaka bill that would restore a measure of sov-
ereignty to the descendants of the illegally-annexed Kingdom of Hawaii as a
517
redistribution of wealth based on race.
Current Chief Justice Roberts expressed similar sentiments in 1983 as an
associate counsel to the president. In a memo on the proposed repeal of the
1953 resolution that declared termination the official congressional policy,
Roberts wrote that to him the resolution read like "motherhood and apple
pie," noting disdainfully that the Indians opposed it because they preferred
"their 'special status'" to equal rights.511 Since he became Chief Justice, the
Court has sped up its attack on tribal interests, granting certiorari in four
512. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
513. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
514. Photographs: Signs along highways on Cayuga Lake, taken by Bethany Berger (June
9, 2009) [hereinafter Cayuga Lake Signs] (on file with author).
515. UPSTATE CITIZENS FOR EQUALITY, http://www.upstate-citizens.org (last visited Mar.
13, 2011).
516. See Michelle Aguilar-Wells & Barbara Leigh Smith, Confronting Racism: Treaty
Beer Comes to Washington State, available at www.evergreen.edu/tribal/docs/
SmithAguilarTreayBeerl2910.doc (depicting and discussing the Treaty Beer cans sold in Wis-
consin).
517. Editorial, Aloha Segregation: The Akaka Bill Would Create a Race-Based State in
Hawaii, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2009, at A26 [hereinafter Aloha Segregation].
518. Memorandum from John G. Roberts, Assoc. Counsel, to Fred F. Fielding, White
House Counsel (Jan. 18, 1983). This and other memoranda are further discussed in Richard A.
Guest, "Motherhood and Apple Pie": Judicial Termination and the Roberts Court, FED. LAW.,
Mar./Apr. 2009, at 52.
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Indian law cases (in three of which there was no split in the courts below)
and ruling against the tribes in each one."9
Thus the same ideas that led to the termination era-that tribal rights are
unequal and unfair-are fueling a contemporary backlash against tribes.
Although Williams and its progeny have created an accepted legal space for
tribal self-government, wherever an issue creates a margin for distinguishing
prior cases, the Court limits such precedents to their facts. And while tribes
remain unified behind the consensus that emerged in the 1950s, attacks on
the equality of self-government policies are powerful rallying cries outside
Indian communities. The history of Williams, in which these same argu-
ments were considered and rejected by Indian tribes in favor of another
understanding of equal participation in the American polity, provides an
instructive lesson in evaluating contemporary claims.
CONCLUSION
On April 27, 2008, forty-nine years after the Court issued its decision,
the Navajo Nation recognized Lorena Williams for her contribution to the
Navajo people. Paul Williams had died in 1979, and Lorena was ninety-
seven years old. Surrounded by generations of her descendants, Navajo
Nation President Joe Shirley and former Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court presented Lorena Williams with an embroi-
dered blanket to honor her. "We want to say thank you for saying they're not
going to walk all over our sovereignty," President Shirley told Mrs.
Williams520.
If they walk all over our sovereignty, they walk all over us, and our chil-
dren, and our children's children. We're not going to allow that. So we're
going to fight for our sovereignty, and I'm sure glad that they did. We can't
say thank you enough.521
Although sovereignty has become the mantra of Navajo politicians, it is
not a meaningful word for many Navajos. During my interview with Verdie
Mae Lee, her son asked me what the concept meant. For ordinary Navajo
people, Williams v. Lee represents not an abstract right like sovereignty but
instead the daily experience of living decently in their own way, with greater
acculturation a choice rather than a necessity. Indeed, Mrs. Williams embod-
ies this idea: at ninety-nine years old, she still lives on the land on which she
and her mother before her were raised, aided by her many children, grand-
children, and great-grandchildren, and supported by a health care system
increasingly administered and staffed by Navajos. One could call this
519. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009); Hawaii v. Office of Ha-
waiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009); Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009); Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
520. Press Release, The Navajo Nation Office of the President & Vice President, Navajo
President Joe Shirley, Jr., commemorates Williams family for persistence that led to U.S. Supreme
Court sovereignty ruling (Apr. 27, 2008) (on file with author).
521. Id.
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sovereignty, or one could call it equality: the equal right to have a decent life
and yet maintain one's culture, choose one's government, and have treaties
made on one's behalf observed.
Today, that right is threatened by the same argument made in the 1940s
and 1950s: that equality demands the end or severe restriction of tribal
rights. The precedent of Williams v. Lee, in which Justice Black recognized
that Indians had initially possessed and been promised the right to retain
their ability to be "separate and independent and themselves," 22 has been
narrowed almost out of existence.523 On roadside billboards,524 in the halls of
Congress,5 25 and in the mainstream press,526 the laws that preserve a "meas-
ured separatism"'2 for tribes are attacked as unequal and unfair. Of course,
just as proponents of termination trumpeted individual Indian equality while
denigrating the self-governance capacity of Indian people, efforts by tribes
to govern themselves are often greeted with disdain. See, for example, the
response of one online commenter to the Blackfeet Tribe's plan to re-write
its 1935 BIA-composed constitution: "First they gotta find some one [sic]
sober enough to write."528
In this atmosphere, the story of Williams v. Lee and the debates of which
it was part provide a valuable reminder. Williams emerges from a period in
which the attacks on the supposed inequality wrought by Indian policy be-
came the policy of the land. Many American Indians initially supported this
policy, seeing in the end of legal separatism the only way to end the crush-
ing poverty and federal domination under which they suffered.9 But
"emancipating the Indians" in practice meant less equality, not more. Termi-
nated tribes like the Menominee, which prior to termination had used its
resources to provide health care and full employment to its members, saw
their property and institutions lost and their communities plunged into wel-
fare dependence.5 30 Tribes rejecting state jurisdiction found their protests
ignored"' and even silenced as the federal government denied them tribal
532
funds to travel to Washington. And in the Navajo Nation, Paul and Lorena
522. Interview with Judge Guido Calabresi, supra note 434.
523. See supra Part V.
524. See Cayuga Lake Signs, supra note 514.
525. See, e.g., Jerry Reynolds, Racially Motivated Native Hawaiian Housing Amendment Fails
in Committee, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Feb. 21, 2007 (describing attacks on Indian Health Care Im-
provement Act and Native Hawaiian Housing Reauthorization Bill as "race-based" legislation).
526. See Aloha Segregation, supra note 517.
527. WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 14.
528. Grizzman, Posting in response to Travis Coleman, Blackfeet Members Meet in Hopes
of Writing New Constitution, (Jan. 26, 2010) greatfallstribune.com.
529. See supra Part IlI.
530. See Herzberg, supra note 117; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-623, at 3 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3700, 3701 (describing loss of tribal cemetery, unemployment, and inadequate
health care of Siletz tribe under termination).
531. Cf In Fairness to the Indian, supra note 113.
532. PHILP, supra note 66, at 117.
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Williams saw the sheep that were the center of their livelihood and culture
seized and sold without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, by order
of a faraway court that conducted its proceedings in a foreign language.
Faced with the realities of this form of equality, tribes came to reject it,
insisting instead on equal rights to govern themselves and their territories, to
be consulted on measures that would deprive them of existing rights, and to
have a decent standard of living without giving up their communities or
identities. By the time Mr. and Mrs. Williams went to their tribal govern-
ment for assistance, the tribe didn't doubt that it should represent them.
Over the next decade, the tribe would put more energy into developing its
tribal institutions, and increasingly insist on structuring these institutions
according to its own preferences. The results are far from perfect, but the
Navajo courts are today a national model5 " and have helped the Navajo Na-
tion weather political turmoil.534 Moreover, the Navajo population, while still
very poor, has tripled in size since Williams " and made significant strides in
health, education, and welfare.
Indian communities across the nation have made similar choices, with
similar results. Although they still lag far behind the general population,
Native people are slowly closing gaps in education, employment, and stan-
dards of living.537 Equally important, they are gaining meaningful control
over their communities, which are far less subject to federal domination or
533. See Daniel L. Lowery, Developing a Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Ex-
perience, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379, 382 n.3 (1993) ("[N]o other tribal court system is as
sophisticated in structure and resources, and more widely viewed as a model of successful tribal
judicial self-reliance, than the Navajo courts."). There are many other scholarly examinations of the
Navajo courts and government generally. See, e.g., RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND
NAVAJO COMMON LAw: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE (2009); Sarah Krakoff, A
Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L.
REV. 1109 (2004); Yazzie, supra note 257.
534. See Navajo Nation v. MacDonald (In re Certified Questions II), N.L.R. Supp. 68 (Nay.
Sup. Ct. 1989) (ruling in lawsuit to remove Navajo Nation Chairman).
535. Compare NAVAJO YEARBOOK, supra note 252, at 321-25 (estimating Navajo population
to be 81,000 to 97,000 in 1961), with BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE REPORT, TABLE: NATIONAL TOTALS: SERVICE
POPULATION: ON-OR-NEAR RESERVATION (2003) (showing Navajo enrollment to be 264,066).
536. Compare NAVAJO YEARBOOK, supra note 252, at 77, 98 (reporting infant mortality rate
in 1957-1959 to be 2.5 times that of the general population), and Navajo Life Span Is Put at 20
Years-U.S. Aide Tells House Unit of Average Tied to Health Hazards on Reservation, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar, 1, 1954, at 27 (reporting Navajo life span to be 20 years compared to 68 for the general popu-
lation), with INDIAN HEALTH SERV., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., REGIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN INDIAN HEALTH 2000-2001, at 32 fig. 3.2, 41 fig. 3.11 (showing low birth weight
and infant mortality to be very similar for Navajos and all races, and overall death rate to be 31
percent higher).
537. While poverty and unemployment remain two to three times higher for Indian reserva-
tions than for the U.S. population as a whole, both gaming and nongaming communities have made
significant strides in closing this gap, as well as the gaps in education, health, and standards of liv-
ing. See JONATHAN B. TAYLOR & JOSEPH P. KALT, CABAZON, THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY
ACT, AND THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN INDIAN GOVERNMENTAL GAMING, A
TEN YEAR REVIEw at xi, 8, 29 (Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev. 2005).
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state discrimination.5" And as others abandon the Plains states for coastal
cities, Indians are moving back to revitalized reservations.539 No longer must
reservation Indians choose, as Chairman Ahkeah suggested in 1949, to ac-
cept state control or leave tribal communities in order to become "little taller
individuals instead of being just children as we are now."5 40
Williams v. Lee is part of what made these changes possible. It affirmed
the continuing vitality of century-old promises of self-governance at a time
when tribes and their members were newly organized to demand that those
promises be fulfilled. It allowed tribes and Indians to choose what equality
meant for them: individual assimilation or respect for their communities.
Empowered to make this choice, Native people insisted that their rights,
their humanity, and their basic equality could not be respected without re-
specting their chosen governments. Williams and the Self-Determination Era
were the result. This history must be remembered as the status of Indians
and their tribes is debated, challenged, and championed today.
538. Since the 1950s, tribes have taken over half of the services formerly administered by
the federal government. 2005 COHEN, supra note 49, at 1346. They run not only casinos but also
companies manufacturing greeting cards, auto electronics, ski resorts, and timber businesses. See
Dennis Hevesi, Philip Martin, Who Led His Tribe to Wealth, is Dead at 83, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15,
2003 (greeting cards and auto electronics); Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Policy, and Prsperity in
Indian Country Today, Community Reinvestment, FED. REs. BK. Ks. CITY (Winter 1997) (ski resorts
and timber) (on file with author). Although anti-Indian discrimination is still a fact of life in many
border communities, tribes and states today frequently work together to collect and distribute taxes,
Amicus Brief of Intertribal Tax Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Wagnon v. Prairie
Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (No. 04-631), police their communities, and manage
shared natural resources. ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 50, at 319, 685-86.
539. Timothy Egan, As Others Abandon Plains, Indians and Bison Come Back, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2001, at Al.
540. Navajo Minutes, supra note 130, at 54 (June 10, 1949).
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